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SPECIAL CLAIMS IMPACTING UPON MARINE
POLLUTION ISSUES AT THE THIRD U.N.




Within the context of the negotiations being conducted at
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III), there are special claims which impact upon marine
pollution issues. While there have been many alleged justifications
for these claims, this analysis will focus upon unilateral extensions
relating to fisheries jurisdiction and protection of the marine envi-
ronment. These unilateral claims will be briefly examined within
the overall context of UNCLOS III, and the classic "process of
claim" will be outlined. Then, those claims which allegedly justify
unilateral action on the basis of "fisheries conservation" and "pro-
tection of the marine environment" will be explored.
The South and Latin American countries originated the mod-
ern concept of unilateral extensions, justifying them as necessary
for the protection and conservation of fish stocks, particularly tuna.
The recent claims and policy arguments used to justify them will
also be examined, with special emphasis being given to the major
unilateral extension of fisheries jurisdiction promulgated by the
United States and its impact on the international community.
This analysis will then focus upon "protection of the marine
environment" as a justification for unilateral extensions of marine
jurisdiction. An examination of recent trends will demonstrate that
claims for jurisdiction over marine pollution have paralleled, and
will continue to parallel, the assertions of fisheries jurisdiction. Al-
though the jurisdictional claims over marine pollution have gener-
ally developed at a slower rate than the claims over fisheries, an
analysis of the recent claims and policy arguments involving
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marine pollution will demonstrate that this latter justification is
gaining momentum. If a generally acceptable treaty is not forth-
coming from the UNCLOS III negotiations, there will be a rash of
claims extending jurisdiction on the basis of protecting the marine
environment.
II. UNILATERAL CLAIMS WITHIN THE OVERALL CONTEXT OF
UNCLOS III
One of the major reasons for convening UNCLOS III was the
proliferation of unilateral action resulting in extensions of maritime
jurisdiction.' Of particular concern were the "unilateral extensions
of the territorial sea and other forms of coastal state jurisdiction"2
which affected narrow straits, fisheries, and major commercial
routes.3
Unilateral actions regarding marine pollution were virtually
nonexistent at the beginning of UNCLOS III. In fact, both the
marine pollution and scientific research issues assigned to Subcom-
mittee III of the Conference were impliedly if not officially treated
as being less important than the other UNCLOS III issue areas.
The Seabed Committee, which was responsible for the preparations
at UNCLOS III, left the preparatory work of Subcommittee III
largely unfinished. The Working Group on Marine Pollution was
established late in the 1972 session of the Seabed Committee meet-
ings, and no formal proposals were submitted to them until the
spring of 1973.' The number of major pollution control issues con-
sidered by the working group was small, and most of the proposals
were tabled.5
For commercial and security reasons the major maritime pow-
ers felt that it was essential to maintain the maritime principles of
"freedom of navigation" and "innocent passage" to the greatest
possible extent. Hence, the first serious unilateral actions were con-
sidered more with regard to their effects on maritime commerce
and navigation than with regard to their influence on marine pollu-
tion and conservation issues, despite the fact that they related to
1. Stevenson & Oxman, The Preparationsfor the Law of the Sea Conference, 68 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1, 2 (1974) thereinafter cited as Preparations]; see Martens, Evolution Of Coastal
State Jurisdiction." .4 Conflict Between Developed and Developing Nations, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q.
531, 543-53 (1976).
2. Preparations, supra note I, at 2.
3. See id. at 9, 10, 19, 20.
4. Id. at 23-24.
5. Id. at 23-26.
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fisheries jurisdiction and protection of the marine environment.
Even with regard to the underdeveloped countries, this policy was
correct since maritime commerce considerations demand a maxi-
mum amount of freedom of navigation as an essential element in
industrializing the underdeveloped countries (commonly referred
to as the South or the Third World). For a better perspective of the
general marine pollution problems, an examination of the early
claims is important in understanding the theoretical aspects of the
"process of claim."6
III. THE PROCESS OF CLAIM
An examination of the classic works in this area reveals that
"[tihe process of claim may be most conveniently described in
terms of certain participants in the world arena, asserting, for many
different objectives, a wide range of claims to authority over the
oceans of the world."7
Through several centuries of interaction, of particular claim and
general community acceptance or rejection, a body of principles
and process of decision were thus developed which achieved a
compromise between demands of coastal and noncoastal states,
roughly corresponding to exclusive and inclusive claims effec-
tively internationalizing in the common interest a great resource
covering two thirds of the earth's surface.
8
The process of claim requires an analysis of participants, objectives,
and authority, including the methodology of claim.
The methods employed include both unilateral assertion and
multilateral agreement and are supported by all the contempo-
rary instruments of policy. The claims, made under all the
changing conditions of the world social processes, have certain
observable effects upon the participants' individual and common
values. As an integral part of this continuous process, partici-
pants invoke both authoritative decision-makers and the applica-
tion of a great variety of technical concepts to assert claims
concerning the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the various specific
demands they make against each other to exercise authority on
6. McDougal & Burke, Crisis In The Law Of The Sea Community Perspectives Versus
National Egoism, 67 YALE L.J. 539, 548 (1958) [hereinafter cited as McDougal & Burke]; see
M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 28-34 (1962) [hereinaf-
ter cited as PUBLIC ORDER]; see McDougal & Schneider, The Protection Of The Environment
And World Public Order.- Some Recent Developments, 45 Miss. L.J. 1085 (1974).
7. McDougal & Burke, supra note 6, at 548.
8. Id. at 540.
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or over the oceans. 9
Nation-states, international governmental organizations, pri-
vate groups and associations, and individuals are all involved in the
process of claim.' 0 The "objectives" of claimant countries "em-
brace all the characteristic demands of the nation-state for the pro-
tection and enhancement of its bases of power,"" and they include:
power, wealth, well-being, respect, skill, solidarity, and rectitude.' 2
All these general objectives, as well as the various particular
claims to the exercise of authority to be described, relate at a
lower level of abstraction to very concrete demands by claimants
to specific uses of the oceans or ocean areas, such as the move-
ment of vessels, the taking of fish, the laying of cables or pipe-
lines, the extraction of minerals, the testing of weapons, the
flying of aircraft, the detention of persons or vessels and so on.
In terms of modalities particularly relevant to the clarification of
community policy, such concrete demands may be further de-
scribed in any necessary detail as exclusive or inclusive, as relat-
ing to an area close to or distant from the coasts of the claimant
state, as substantial or insubstantial in scope of authority de-
manded, as relating to the vital or nonvital values of the claim-
ant state, as for permanent or temporary enjoyment, as
appropriate or inappropriate to the economic use of the area in
which asserted, as proportionate or disproportionate to the inter-
ests sought to be protected, as interfering or not interfering with
uses by other states, as causing serious or minor damage to the
interests of other states, as causing avoidable or unavoidable in-
jury and so on.'
3
For purposes of the present discussion, these objectives will be lim-
ited specifically to their effects upon marine pollution and conser-
vation issues. "The specific claims to authority asserted by states in
seeking their diverse objectives may be categorized in terms of the
degree of comprehensiveness of authority claimed and of the geo-
graphical area in which it is asserted,"' 4 and for each claim to au-
thority "there is an opposing counterclaim by other states asserting
both freedom from the claimant's authority and a competence to
exercise their own authority. ' ' 5
9. Id. at 548; see PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 6, at 28-34; McDougal & Burke, supra
note 6, at 555, 559-67.
10. McDougal & Burke, supra note 6, at 548-49.
II. Id. at 549.
12. Id. at 549-50.
13. Id. at 550.
14. Id. at 550; see PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 6, at 36-49.
15. McDougal & Burke, supra note 6, at 551.
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The classic delimitations of claims in accordance with the
"process of claim," as one of the fundamental elements of an analy-
sis in a community context,' 6 are as follows:
a. claims to authority over internal waters,
b. claims to authority over the territorial sea,
c. claims to delimit the boundary between internal waters and terri-
torial sea,
d. claims to determine the width of the territorial sea,
e. claims to authority in ocean areas adjacent to the territorial sea,
and
f. claims to shared use and competence upon the high seas.
17
The first category, "claims to authority over internal waters,""8 in-
volves the subcategory of, "claims to resources" in internal waters,
which includes marine pollution issues. Since these resources are
exclusively within the control of the coastal nation, coastal nations
have traditionally had the exclusive right to regulate or ignore
marine pollution in their internal waters.'9 This traditional right
has been modified somewhat by the marine pollution provisions of
the Informal Composite Negotiating Text/Revision 2 (ICNT/
Rev.2),2° currently being negotiated at UNCLOS III. Article 192 of
the ICNT/Rev.2 provides that "States have the obligation to pro-
tect and preserve the marine environment.' Under articles 193
and 194 "claims to resources" are limited by general anti-pollution
provisions.22 Article 193 provides that "States have the sovereign
right to exploit their natural resources pursuant to their environ-
mental policies and in accordance with their duty to protect and
preserve the marine environment,"2 3 while article 194 requires that
"States shall take all necessary measures consistent with this Con-
vention to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine envi-
ronment from any source, "24 including land-based pollution, air-
borne pollution, dumping, and pollution from vessels and installa-
tions (exploiting marine resources). 25 The specific requirement is
that "States shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and
16. See PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 6, at 1-87.
17. See id. at xv-xx; McDougal & Burke, supra note 6, at 551-54.
18. PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 6, at 89-173; McDougal & Burke, supra note 6, at 551-52.
19. See PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 6, at 173.
20. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP. 10/Rev. 2 (1980), repriniedin 18 INT'L LEGAL MATS.
686 (1979) [hereinafter cited as ICNT/Rev.2].
21. Id. art. 192.
22. Id. arts. 193 & 194.
23. Id. art. 193.
24. Id. art. 194, para. I.
25. Id. art. 194, para. 3(a)-(d); see id. arts. 207-12.
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control"26 marine pollution from land-based sources," sea-bed ac-
tivities,2" activities in the Area29 (ile., the oceans space beyond na-
tional jurisdiction), dumping,30 vessels,3 and the atmosphere.
3 2
The second category, "claims to authority over the territorial
sea,"" is limited in the area of marine pollution by the same
ICNT/Rev.2 articles. Traditionally, there was "wide agreement
that coastal competence over a marginal belt of relatively narrow
width should include exclusive control over all resources therein.
34
This was especially true for fisheries, which were considered the
most important resource in the territorial sea until the compara-
tively recent discoveries of valuable nonliving resources such as oil
and gas.35
In 1702 Bynkershoek formulated the "cannon-shot doctrine"
which stated that permanent dominion over offshore areas could be
maintained only by coastal fortifications. Eight decades later,
Galiani suggested that these territorial waters be limited to one
marine league or 3 nautical miles, even though this distance was
beyond the range of land-based cannons at that time.36 Prior ver-
sions of the 3-mile rule had been used during the 1600's to exclude
the Dutch from fishing near the British coasts. Under this theory
the Dutch agreed that on a clear day they would not fish within
eyesight of the British coast. 37 Thus, "the bitter, centuries-old con-
troversy over the limit of the territorial sea indicates the abiding
strength of the expectation that the coastal state is entitled to exer-
cise exclusive disposition of fisheries within it."
38
At the Hague Codification Conference in 1930, 42 nations
attempted but failed to agree on a common limit. Many states
argued for six miles, while others wanted to avoid a uniform lim-
26. See id. arts. 207-12.
27. Id. art. 207, paras. I & 7.
28. Id. art. 208, paras. 1-3.
29. Id. art. 209, paras. 1-2.
30. Id. art. 210, paras. 1-3, 5-6.
31. Id. art. 211, paras. 2-6.
32. Id. art. 212, paras. 1-2.
33. See PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 6, at 174-304; McDougal & Burke, supra note 6, at
552.
34. PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 6, at 302 (emphasis added).
35. See id., Franssen, OilAnd Gas In The Oceans, 26 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 50 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Franssen].
36. Alexander & Hodgson, The Impact of the 200-Mile Economic Zone on the Law of the
Sea, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 569, 569 (1975); see Martens, supra note 1, at 532.
37. PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 6, at 303-04 nn.319-20. See generally S. SWARZ-
TRAUBER, THE THREE MILE LIMIT OF TERRITORIAL SEAS (1972).
38. PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 6, at 303.
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itation for all countries or insisted on the inclusion of a contigu-
ous zone with special rights for the coastal state. Neither course
was acceptable to Great Britain, the United States, Japan, and
the other maritime nations who strongly advocated the three
mile limit.
39
The third traditional category of claims, "claims to delimit the
boundary between internal waters and territorial sea,"4 ° evolves
from variations in the methods used for drawing baselines in the
coastal configuration. When a particular method of delimitation is
asserted it can result in too great an encroachment upon the high
seas, increasing the area over which exclusive authority is exercised
to the detriment of freedom of navigation and fishing."a However,
these is general consensus on the ICNT/Rev.2 articles relating to
this issue probably because the focus of limiting unilateral exten-
sions has shifted out to 200 miles and because baseline distinctions
are de minimus when compared to the 200 mile disputes.
4 2
"Claims to determine the width of the territorial sea" 43 have
been resolved in a similar manner. Article 3 of the ICNT/Rev.2
specifically provides that "[elvery State has the right to establish the
breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical
miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this
Convention."' ' Whether or not the ICNT/Rev.2 is eventually
adopted by the world community is irrelevant with regard to the
12-mile limit, because article 3 is merely a restatement of custom-
ary international law.
"Claims to authority in ocean areas adjacent to the territorial
sea,"4 the fifth category, may be subdivided into claims for exclu-
sive control of living and nonliving (mineral) resources. Histori-
cally, "[c]laims have been made for customs inspection, anti-
smuggling measures, conservation and exclusive exploitation of
animal resources, exclusive exploitation of mineral resources, de-
fensive measures such as radar platforms, defensive areas within
which navigation is limited or temporarily excluded and so
39. Martens, supra note I, at 533.
40. McDougal & Burke, supra note 6, at 552. See generally PUBLIC ORDER, supra note
6, at 305-445.
41. McDougal & Burke, supra note 6, at 553.
42. See ICNT/Rev.2, supra note 21, arts. 2-16; Krueger & Nordquist, The Evolution Of
The 200-Mile Exclusive Economic Zone. State Practice In The Pacific Basin, 19 VA. J. INT'L
L. 321, 321-22 (1979).
43. See McDougal & Burke, supra note 6, at 553. See generally PUBLIC ORDER, supra
note 6, at 446-563.
44. ICNT/Rev.2, supra note 20, art. 3.
45. McDougal & Burke, supra note 6, at 553-54.
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forth."4 6 With regard to the valuable nonliving resources 47 of the
oceans, "it would appear genuinely within the common interests of
all peoples to promote exploitation and production of the mineral
resources of the ocean floor."' 48 The dearth of protests to unilateral
claims exacerbated the problem.
The number and pattern of state claims, unilaterally made
and exhibiting divergencies of considerable importance but also
expressing practically universal consensus on the desirability of
exclusive coastal control, coupled with the lack of protest in rela-
tion to the control over mineral resources, gave substantial
ground for suggestion that the honoring by others of these claims
was within the reasonable expectations of those making them.
Within only five years of the initial unilateral claim by the
United States [via the Truman Proclamations], 49 authoritative
commentators on international law were not unwilling to ex-
press, in print, the opinion that the continental shelf doctrine, the
shorthand articulation for exclusive control over adjacent sub-
marine areas by coastal states, had become a principle of cus-
tomary international law.
50
In the area of valuable living resources, 51 the "primary goal of gen-
eral community policy . . . must of course be, as it was with respect
to mineral resources in the same areas, that of encouraging the
highest possible productivity in the use of resources which is com-
patible with equitable and orderly development.
52
The final category of claims consists of "claims to shared use
and competence upon the high seas."' 53 This category includes
"claims relating to the control of pollution, 54 which was originally
concerned with pollution caused by "the discharge of oil from ships
and from the deposit of radioactive materials through weapons tests
and waste disposal. ' 55 This category was also concerned with
"claims for the appropriation and conservation of marine animal
resources."56
This traditional categorization is important because it provides
46. Id. at 554.
47. See Franssen, supra note 35, at 50-51.
48. PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 6, at 631.
49. For a review of the Truman Proclamations, see notes 108-12 infra and accompany-
ing text.
50. PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 6, at 637-38.
51. See Franssen, supra note 35, at 50-51.
52. PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 6, at 642.
53. Id. at 730-1007; McDougal & Burke, supra note 6, at 554-55.
54. PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 6, at 848-67.
55. id. at 848; see id. at 848-67.
56. See generally id. at 923-1007.
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a perspective on the differing specialized claims impacting on
marine pollution issues. In addition, analyses of the well-known
claims for marine conservation and protection, which in the past
have been used as a justification for unilateral action, are better
understood when viewed within the over-all context of the "process
of claim." The impact of unilateral claims on marine protection
issues received most of its early impetus from two areas: (1) unilat-
eral extensions to claim extended fisheries jurisdiction, and (2) uni-
lateral extensions to claim protection over the marine environment.
IV. CLAIMS ALLEGEDLY JUSTIFYING UNILATERAL ACTION
A. Claims Involving Unilateral Extensions of
Fisheries Jurisdiction
1. Trends in Decision. There is nearly a 30-year history of
Eastern Pacific fishing disputes over tuna.57 After World War II,
fourteen nations became involved in Eastern Pacific tuna fishing.58
As production increased, it soon became apparent that over-fishing
was a definite threat, and disputes arose.59  In 1950 the United
States and Costa Rica founded the Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission (IATTC),6 ° via a convention which was adhered to by
several other countries.61 Ecuador joined IATTC in 1951 but with-
drew in 1968 due to a conflict over territorial sea claims.6" Thereaf-
ter, the Peru, Ecuador, Chile group (PEC) was formed, and it
assumed a leadership role in this area, speaking on behalf of several
South and Latin American countries. "For some years now claims
to a 200-mile zone have been accumulating-with Latin American
57. See Loring, The United States-Peruvian "Fisheries" Dispute, 23 STAN. L. REV. 391,
391-94 (1971).
58. Fisher, Wood, & Burge, Latin American Unilateral Declarations Of 200-Mile Off-
shore Exclusive Fisheries: Toward Resolving The Problems OfAccess Faced By The US.
Tunafish Industry, 9 Sw. U.L. REV. 643, 644 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Fisher]; see Loring,
supra note 57, at 391-99.
59. Fisher, supra note 58, at 644.
60. Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commis-
sion, signed May 31, 1949, [19501 U.S.T. 230, T.I.A.S. No. 2044, 80 U.N.T.S. 3.
61. The traditional members of IATTC have been Canada, Costa Rica, Japan, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, and the United States. Due to the recent revolution in Nicaragua, it is
still unsettled as to Nicaragua's current status in IATTC.
62. Fisher, supra note 58, at 645. Similarly, in the area of marine mammals, several
Latin American countries belong to the Permanent Commission of the Conference on the
Use and Conservation of the Marine Resources of the South Pacific, an international organi-
zation which competes with the more well-known International Whaling Commission
(IWC). See Agreement Establishing the South Pacific Commission, signed Feb. 6, 1947,
[195112 U.S.T. 1787, T.I.A.S. No. 2317,97 U.N.T.S. 277; Pijanowski, Comments on Fisheries
and the Law of the Sea, II MARINE TECH. Soc'v J. 34, 34 (1977).
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countries being notable among the early claimants."63 While some
countries have claimed 200-mile territorial seas, others have
claimed 200-mile "exclusive fishing zones" or "economic zones."
These claims are summarized in Table I, and are important because
"[olver 90 percent by volume of the world commercial catch is esti-
mated as being taken within 200 miles of land."64
TABLE I







































































































63. Copes, The Law of the Sea and Management of Anadromous Fish Stocks, 4 OCEAN
DEV. & INT'L L.J. 233, 234 (1977).















I. Does not affect right of navigation or overflight.
2. Pending proclamation of the 200-mile provisions of Fisheries Amendment Act,
1978.
3. Territory not yet independent.
4. 50-mile exclusive fishery zone.
5. Excludes highly migratory species.
6. 20 to 200-mile zone.
7. Subject to preemption by UNCLOS treaty.
8. Modified archipelago.
9. 150-mile exclusive economic zone.
10. Member of European Economic Community, which voted to extend the fishing
limits of members to 200 miles.
11. Has passed EEZ legislation but currently enforces only fishery jurisdiction.
Source: Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 42, at 373.
Claims to jurisdiction over the continental shelf and claims to
a resource-oriented zone extending beyond the territorial sea,
originated in South America. In addition, claims to fisheries juris-
diction also received much of their impetus from the South Ameri-
can countries: Consequently, South and Latin American claims
will be examined, while those involving the Asian and African
countries"5 will generally be omitted since they basically followed
the lead of the American countries.
In 1919 Columbia claimed the right to exploit offshore hydro-
carbons located within its territorial sea.66 In 1923 this right was
expanded when Columbia extended its jurisdiction over hydrocar-
bons and fisheries from the traditional three mile limit to twelve
miles.67 Panama claimed jurisdiction over pearls situated beyond
its territorial sea in 1921,6" and in 1935 Venezuela did the same.69
By 1941 Venezuela claimed the fishery resources of its continental
65. For a summary of the unilateral claims of Asian countries, see Martens, supra note
1, at 542. See also, Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 42, at 337-73. For a summary of the
unilateral claims of African countries, see Martens, supra note 1, at 541. See also Krueger &
Nordquist, supra note 42, at 327-28, 337-73.
66. Law No. 120 of 30 December 1919 concerning deposits of hydrocarbons, art. 38,
reprinted in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/15, at 58 (1970); see I A. SZEKELY, LATIN AMERICA
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 38 (1976).
67. Law No. 14 of 31 January 1923 amending the law concerning deposits of hydrocar-
bons, art. 17, reprinted in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/15, at 59 (1970); see SZEKELY, supra
note 66, at 38.
68. 1931 Fiscal Code of Panama, tit. V, ch. III, cited in SZEKELY, supra note 66, at 38,
and in Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 42, at 324 n.15.
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shelf ' and during 1942 concluded a treaty with the United
Kingdom dividing the seabed and subsoil of the Gulf of Paria.7'
Argentina made a claim in 1944 over the mineral reserves of its
continental shelf,72 and in 1945, Mexico asserted jurisdiction over
its continental shelf, including a fishery conservation zone.73
Argentina expanded its claims in 1946 to include both the resources
of the continental shelf and the superjacent waters,74 although there
was some doubt surrounding Argentina's interpretation of the term
"epicontinental sea."' 75 In a similar manner, Panama made claims
to regulate "shark fishing."
76
In 1947 an important step was taken when Chile
77 and Peru 78
claimed a 200-mile "patrimonial sea" in which they could assert
national sovereignty to preserve and exploit all of the living and
nonliving "patrimonial" resources. Peru calls this 200-mile zone a
"maritime zone,"' 79 but this claim is arguably a claim to a 200-mile
territorial sea when read within the context of Peru's 1952 Petro-
leum Law,80 the 1955 resolution on the maritime zone,8' the 1965
law on civil aeronautics," the 1970 decree on maritime mining,
83
69. Venezuelan Pearl Fisheries Act No. 19,143 of 22 July 1935, citedin SZEKELY, supra
note 66, at 39, andin Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 42, at 324 n.15.
70. Venezuelan Act of 22 July 1941, arts. 7-8, reprinted in SZEKELY, supra note 66, at 39.
71. Treaty relating to the submarine areas of the Gulf of Paria, 26 February 1942, U.K.-
Venezuela, [1942] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 10. (Cmd. 6400), reprinted in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/
SER.B/I, at 44 (1951).
72. Decree No. 1,386, concerning mineral reserves, 24 January 1944, art. 2 (Argentina),
reprinted in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/1, at 3 (1951).
73. Presidential Declaration with respect to continental shelf, 29 October 1945
(Mexico), reprinted in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/I, at 13-14 (1951); see Martens, supra
note I, at 533.
74. Decree No. 14,708, concerning national sovereignty over epicontinental sea and the
Argentine continental shelf, II October 1946, reprinted in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/I, at
4-5 (1951).
75. Martens, supra note 1, at 534 n.17.
76. Decree No. 449, for the regulation of shark fishing by foreign vessels in the waters
under the jurisdiction of the Republic, 17 December 1946, art. 3 (Panama), reprinted in U.N.
Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/I, at 16 (1951).
77. Presidential Declaration concerning continental shelf, 23 June 1947 (Chile), re-
printed in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/I, at 6-7 (1951); see Alexander & Hodgson, supra
note 36, at 585-86.
78. Presidential Decree No. 781, concerning submerged continental or insular shelf, I
August 1947 (Peru), reprintedin U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/I, at 16-18 (1951).
79. Id.
80. Petroleum Law of 12 March 1952, No. 11780 of 1952, art. 14 (Peru), reprinted in
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/16, at 163 (1974).
8 1. Supreme Resolution No. 23 of 12 January 1955 determining the Peruvian 200-mile
maritime zone, reprinted in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/16, at 27 (1974).
82. Law No. 15720 of 11 November 1965 on civil aeronautics, art. 2 (Peru), reprintedin
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/16, at 28 (1974).
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and the 1971 General Fishing Law.84 These early claims laid the
foundation for the Santiago Declaration of 195285 in which Peru,
Ecuador, and Chile claimed national sovereignty over 200-mile
zones, while keeping the right of innocent passage inviolate. In
1966 Ecuador claimed a 200-mile territorial sea.86
By 1970 several Latin American countries had joined this
trend toward exercising national sovereignty over marine resources.
There appeared to be no limit to these claims other than the "rea-
sonableness," which was specified in the subsequent declarations;
namely, the Montevideo Declaration on the Law of the Sea (Decla-
ration of Montevideo)8 7 and the Declaration of the Latin American
States on the Law of the Sea (Declaration of Lima).88 However,
limits were later specified in the Declaration of Santo Domingo.89
The declaration asserted the right to a 12-mile territorial sea and a
200-mile patrimonial sea. Within the 200-mile patrimonial sea the
traditional freedoms of navigation, overflight, and the laying of
submarine cables and pipelines were maintained, with the coastal
nations assuming jurisdiction over all marine resources, marine
83. Normative Legislative Decree No. 18225 of 14 April 1970, concerning the mining
industry, art. 2 (Peru), reprinted in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/16, at 98 (1974).
84. General Fishing Law of 1971, Legislative Decree No. 18810 of March 1971 (Peru),
reprinted in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/16, at 315-16 (1974).
85. Agreements between Chile, Ecuador and Peru, signed at the First Conference on the
Exploitation and Conservation of the Maritime Resources of the South Pacific, Santiago, 18
August 1952, Declaration on the Maritime Zone, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/6, at 723-24
(1957) and U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/10/Rev.I, at 11-12 (1968), reprinted in I NEW DIRECTIONS
IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 231 (S. Lay, R. Churchill, & M. Nordquist eds. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as 1 NEW DIRECTIONS]; see Loring, supra note 57, at 402-03; Martens, supra note 1, at
534-35.
86. Ecuadorian Civil Code of 20 August 1960, bk. I1, tit. III, art. 633, as amended De-
cree No. 1542 of 10 November 1966, reprinted in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/15, at 78
(1970). For an analysis of Latin American claims after 1965, see Martens, supra note 1, at
538-41.
87. Montevideo Declaration on Law of the Sea, May 8, 1970, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/34
(1970), reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1081 (1970) andin I NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note
85, at 106. Participants in the Declaration of Montevideo were Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay. Id., Martens, supra note 1,
at 539.
88. Declaration of the Latin American States on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/AC.
138/28 (1970), reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 107 (1971). The nine countries which
agreed to the Declaration of Montevideo also agreed to the Declaration of Lima, and they
were joined by Columbia, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico.
The landlocked countries of Bolivia and Paraguay objected to the Declaration of Lima as
being unresponsive to the problems of landlocked countries, and Barbados, Jamaica, Trini-
dad and Tobago, and Venezuela objected to the criterion of reasonableness. Martens, supra
note 1, at 539-40 nn.55 & 56.
89. Declaration of Santo Domingo, June 7, 1972, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 21) (A/
8721) 70, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/80 (1972), reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 892 (1972).
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pollution, and scientific research.9"
2. Recent Claims and Policy Arguments. Historically, unilat-
eral claims have created problems for the fishing industry. One no-
table incident occurred in November, 1954, when Peru seized five
whaling vessels and a subsequent fine of $3 million was paid by
their owner, Aristotle Onassis.9' Recently, the Ecuadorian Decree
of December, 1974, was issued. It prohibits all foreign vessels of
more than 600 tons from fishing within Ecuador's 200-mile zone
and requires all fishing vessels under 600 tons to obtain an
Ecuadorian fishing license.92 On January 25, 1975, Ecuadorian
warships seized four United States tuna boats. A few days later
they seized one Spanish, two Canadian, and three more United
States boats.93 Considering the fact that UNCLOS III was debat-
ing the 200-mile issue at the time, these seizures were inexcusable.94
Although United States fishing vessels can generally receive reim-
bursements for such losses under the Fishermen's Protective Act,95
this unilateral action by Ecuador caused serious concern not only in
the United States, but also among the other maritime powers. PEC
was obviously trying to establish precedent for unilateral extensions
in an attempt to realize profits from future concession agreements,
joint ventures, and licenses for foreign fishermen.9 6 In addition,
PEC had political reasons for asserting this viewpoint:
The governments of the smaller South American countries take
pride in their resistance to mega-power incursions. This ethno-
centric posture, of dubious transnational value, is nevertheless
significant in its intransigence. It demands accommodation
before any lasting access agreement can be reached.97
The specific legal arguments asserted by PEC began with the
"bioma theory," an appeal for equity. The bioma theory was based
on PEC's biological dependence upon the ecosystem supported by
the Humboldt Current, which flows by the South American west
90. Id. Participants approving the Declaration of Santo Domingo were: Columbia,
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. Participants abstaining were: Barbados, El Salvador,
Guyana, Jamaica, and Panama. Martens, supra note 1, at 540-41, 540 n.64.
91. Martens, supra note 1, at 535; see Loring, supra note 57, at 403-04.
92. Fisher, supra note 58, at 643; see 7 Tuna Vessels Fined $1. 7 Million in Ecuador, L.A.
Times, Feb. 15, 1975, § 1, at 23, col. 1.
93. Fisher, supra note 58, at 643.
94. See Preparations, supra note I, at 2, 8-23.
95. Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967, 22 U.S.C. § 1971 et. seq. (1977).
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coast and is approximately 200 miles wide.9" This west coast area,
particularly Chile, is arid because the cold Humboldt Current pre-
vents cloud formation.99 The run-off from the Andes mountains
causes a high erosion rate along this dry coast which fertilizes the
adjacent sea, resulting in large amounts of anchoveta which sup-
port the seabirds that create the valuable guano deposits.I °" "Be-
cause the land is deprived by the sea current and erosion wash-off,
and the marine life enriched, PEC argues that it has a right to com-
pensation in the form of fishing resources within the 200-mile
belt."'' The nutrition and income of the people in this area alleg-
edly depends upon the fish that are caught.° 2 "The bioma theorists
further claim that indiscriminate foreign fishing in the Humboldt
will rupture the ecosystem,"'0 3 thus destroying the tuna, achoveta,
and other marine resources.
The bioma theory was "a clever response to the Truman Proc-
lamation of 1945."" The Truman Proclamation consisted of two
proclamations and two companion executive orders; the first proc-
lamation 0 5 and its companion executive order claimed"° "the nat-
ural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf
beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United
States as appertaining to the United States, [and] subject to its juris-
diction and control."' 07 The United States carefully limited its
claim and preserved freedom of navigation in this area. The sec-
ond proclamation,'o and its companion executive order,' I claimed
the right to establish fishery conservation zones in the waters con-
98. Id. at 648.
99. Id; see Loring, supra note 57, at 416-17.
100. Fisher, supra note 58, at 648; see Loring, supra note 57, at 416-17.
101. Fisher, supra note 58, at 648.
102. Martens, supra note 1, at 534.
103. Fisher, supra note 58, at 648.
104. Id. at 649; see Hollick, U.S. Oceans Policy. The Truman Proclamations, 17 VA. J.
INT'L L. 23 (1976). See also STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON COM., Sci., & TRANSP., 95TH
CONG., IST SESS., CONGRESS & THE OCEANS: MARINE AFFAIRS IN THE 94TH CONGRESS 109
(Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as CONGRESS & THE OCEANS]. See generally Morris &
Kindt, The Law of the Sea.- Domestic and International Considerations Arisingfrom the Classi-
fication of Floating Nuclear Power Plants and Their Breakwaters as Artificial Islands, 19 VA. J.
INT'L L. 299, 305 (1979).
105. Policy of the United States With Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and
Seabed of the Continental Shelf Pres. Proc. No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-48 Compilation),
reprinted in I NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 85, at 106. When most writers mention the
"Truman Proclamation," they are generally referring only to this first proclamation.
106. Exec. Order No. 9633, 3 C.F.R. 437 (1943-48 Compilation), reprintedin 1 NEW DI-
RECTIONS, supra note 85, at 108.
107. Id.
108. Policy of the United States With Respect to Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the
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tiguous to the United States." 0 The purpose of the Truman Procla-
mations was to preserve and protect the marine resources of the
United States continental shelves. This "same rationale of conser-
vation is, of course, applicable to the Humboldt Current.""'
These arguments are not only misleading, but also invalid.
The Truman Proclamations were unilateral actions of dubious in-
ternational validity. They were more a statement of policy by the
United States executive branch, implemented by "executive or-
ders," not "federal statues," which ostensibly carry more authority
in the international community. The thrust of the Truman Procla-
mations was also directed primarily at the subsoil and seabed of the
continental shelves and not at the living resources. I 2 They acted
provisionally to fill a void in international law, and "although this
unilateral action was not recognized internationally at .. .[the]
time, the doctrine was subsequently ratified by the First Law of the
Sea Conference [UNCLOS I] held in Geneva in 1958."
'"13
One of the four 1958 conventions, the Convention on the Con-
tinental Shelf' (hereinafter referred to as Continental Shelf Con-
vention), stated that a coastal nation "exercises over the continental
shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting
its natural resources."" 5 Further, "natural resources . . . consist of
the mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and sub-
soil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species,
that is to say, organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are
immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in
High Seas, Pres. Proc. No. 2668, 3 C.F.R. 68 (1943-48 Compilation), reprinted in I NEW
DIRECTIONS, supra note 85, at 95.
109. Exec. Order No. 9634, 3 C.F.R. 437 (1943-48 Compilation), reprinted in I NEW DI-
RECTIONS, supra note 85, at 97.
110. Hollick, supra note 104, at 23; see Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 42, at 324-26.
111. Fisher, supra note 58, at 649.
112. Exec. Order No. 9633, 3 C.F.R. 437 (1943-48 Compilation); see CONGRESS & THE
OCEANS, supra note 104, at 109.
113. CONGRESS & THE OCEANS, supra note 104, at 109.
114. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done Apr. 29, 1958, [1964] 1 U.S.T. 471,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter cited as Continental Shelf Convention].
The three other 1958 conventions are: Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Liv-
ing Resources of the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, [19661 1 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969,
599 U.N.T.S. 285 [hereinafter cited as Fishing Convention]; Convention on the High Seas,
done Apr. 29, 1958, 11962] 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter
cited as High Seas Convention]; Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,
done Apr. 29, 1958, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter
cited as Territorial Sea Convention].
115. Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 114, at art. 2, para. I.
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constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil."' 16 Under
these provisons the PEC countries could validly claim jurisdiction
not over living resources, but only over the nonliving resources and
sedentary species of their relatively narrow continental shelves.
Furthermore, the 1958 Convention on the High Seas" 7 (here-
inafter referred to as High Seas Convention), states that no country
may "validly purport to subject any part of. . . [the high seas] to
its sovereignty,""' with the "freedom of fishing" being expressly
retained." 9 The United States has consistently relied upon records
of the 1960 Geneva Conference (UNCLOS II) and reports of the
International Law Commission to support the position that the
"high seas" are those waters beyond a 12-mile limit. 120 The United
States-Canadian resolution seeking to establish a 6-mile territorial
sea and a 12-mile fisheries limit, failed by one vote to achieve the
two-thirds majority of the 88 countries attending UNCLOS 11.121
Although some authors would view this vote as an indication of
strong opposition to the concept of a 12-mile limit, 22 the close vote
indicates otherwise. Additionally, the ICNT/Rev.2, which consti-
tutes the latest pronouncement on this subject, specifically states
that the maximum territorial sea which can be claimed is 12 nauti-
cal miles. 123
The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas2 4 (hereinafter referred to as Fishing
Convention) further states "[i]f the nationals of two or more States
are engaged in fishing the same stock, .... these States shall, at the
request of either of them, enter into negotiations ... 125 Other
dispute settlement provisions may be found in article 4, paragraph
2, and in article 9.126 During the tuna disputes these provisions
were apparently ignored. Regardless of whether a nation has spe-
cifically acceded to any of the four 1958 Conventions, all nations
116. Id. art. 2, para. 4.
117. High Seas Convention, supra note 114.
118. Id. art. 2.
119. Id.
120. Fisher, supra note 58, at 647; see Loring, supra note 57, at 410-12; Martens, supra
note 1, at 536-37.
121. Second U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.19/
L. 12 (1960); see Fisher, supra note 58, at 647; Loring, supra note 57, at 412; Martens, supra
note 1, at 537.
122. Fisher, supra note 58, at 647.
123. ICNT/Rev.2, supra note 20, art. 3.
124. Fishing Convention, supra note 114.
125. Id. art. 4, para. 1.
126. Id. art. 9 and art. 4, para. 2.
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are impliedly bound, as these conventions now constitute custom-
ary international law. One of the overriding considerations in these
conventions is the prevention of unilateral extensions of jurisdic-
tion.
Those countries opposing an extension of the territorial sea
point to the fact that "[f]or over 300 years coastal States have exer-
cised jurisdiction over only a narrow belt encircling their coasts; the
entire area beyond has been considered the high seas, available for
inclusive use by all nations, but not subject to appropriation by any
nation."' 2 7 The 1974 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case'28 decided by the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) held in part that Iceland's
claim of a 50-mile exclusive fishing zone violated international
law. 129 Prior to this 1974 case, reliance was placed on the 1951 An-
glo-Norwegian Fisheries Case,'3 ° which recognized the right of
coastal nations "to make claims to an exclusive fishery jurisdiction
beyond three miles"; 131 however, claims had to be "moderate and
reasonable."' 132 Since only 18 countries claimed a territorial sea
greater than 12 miles 33 in 1974, it is difficult to conceive of Ecua-
dor's 200-mile territorial sea claim of 1966114 as moderate and rea-
sonable, since Ecuador was basically alone in the international
community in asserting such a claim.'35 However, considering the
current trends as evidenced in the ICNT/Rev.2 which provides for
a 200-mile economic zone, 136 a 200-mile "economic zone" would
now be considered moderate and reasonable. It is incorrect to refer
to this 200-mile zone as an "exclusive economic zone," because the
rights which are granted to coastal nations under the ICNT/Rev.2
are by no means "exclusive."'
137
127. Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 42, at 321-22; see Fisher, supra note 58, at 647.
128. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, [1974] I.C.J. 3, 175.
129. Id. The dispute between the United Kingdom and Iceland over the Icelandic
fisheries had its beginnings in 1952, and in 1961 it was temporarily settled when the two
countries agreed to submit future disputes to the ICJ. Exchange of Notes between the Gov-
ernments of Iceland and of the United Kingdom, Mar. 11, 1961, 397 U.N.T.S. 275. For a
brief history of the Icelandic fisheries disputes, see Martens, supra note 1, at 535-36.
130. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. 86, 116.
131. Fisher, supra note 58, at 649.
132. [1951] I.C.J. 86, at 142. Contra, Fisher, supra note 58, at 649.
133. Fisher, supra note 58, at 647.
134. Ecuadorian Civil Code of 20 August 1960, bk. II., tit. II1, art. 633, as amended De-
cree No. 1542 of 10 November 1966, reprinted in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/15, at 78
(1970).
135. See Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 42, at 326-27.
136. ICNT/Rev.2, supra note 20, arts. 55-75. See generally Krueger & Nordquist, supra
note 42, at 321-400.
137. See, e.g., ICNT/Rev.2, supra note 20, art. 58.
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During the tuna disputes PEC claimed that under the Charter
of the Organization of American States 3 ' (OAS Charter), membtr
countries, such as the United States, were obligated to respect
PEC's (and particularly Ecuador's) fundamental rights.' 39 The
claim was that the 200-mile limit was necessary to defend Ecua-
dor's "integrity and independence" under article 9 of the OAS
Charter. 140 A secondary claim alleged that United States objec-
tions to the 200-mile limit "constituted interference" directed at an
internal policy decision, thus violating the 1936 Inter-American
Additional Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention.' 4 ' An in-depth
look at the substance of these claims reveals that they are specious,
tainted with the South American resistance to anything associated
with the developed countries.
142
A final argument by PEC was founded in the doctrine of es-
toppel, the claim being that the United States and other countries
which had made unilateral and multilateral claims were estopped
to deny similar claims by PEC.' 43 Reference was made to the 1939
Declaration of Panama" in which several American nations, in-
cluding the United States, "created a 300-mile sovereign jurisdic-
tion for purposes of economic survival."'' 45  Circumstances
surrounding this declaration reveal, however, that the purpose of
the declaration was self-defense; 46 it was not a unilateral declara-
tion. The declaration was made at the beginning of World War II,
and was reasonable in light of the existing global situation. These
"common law" estoppel arguments asserted by the "civil law"
countries comprising PEC are interesting, since PEC has consist-
ently discounted other common law principles which have been
used to support certain positions at UNCLOS III. Consistent with
this line of reasoning, PEC is now estopped to deny these other
common law principles. Thus, statements to the effect that "[o]n
balance, the PEC arguments seem more cogent and more firmly
rooted in substantive international law," 47 are unfounded, and re-
138. Signed Apr. 30, 1948, [1951] 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3.
139. See id. art. 9.
140. Id.
141. Dec. 23, 1936, 51 Stat. 41, T.S. No. 923.
142. See notes 96-97 supra and accompanying text.
143. See Fisher, supra note 58, at 649-50; Loring, supra note 57, at 420-21.
144. 5 Foreign Rel. U.S. 36-57 (1939).
145. Fisher, supra note 58, at 650.
146. Loring, supra note 57, at 496-97.
147. Fisher, supra note 58, at 650. Statements mentioning a United States "law ex-
tending the United States' territorial sea to 200 miles" are not only misleading but also puz-
1980 415
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veal a lack of understanding of even the basic tenets of interna-
tional law.'48 An in-depth analysis of each of PEC's arguments in
the tuna disputes demonstrates that when those arguments were
made substantive international law definitely refuted such claims to
a 200-mile "territorial sea," "exclusive fishing zone," or "economic
zone.'"
3. The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976:
A Unilateral Disaster for the United States
The enactment of the Fishery Conservation and Management
Act of 1976 (FCMA)'49 by the United States, which unilaterally
extended United States fisheries jurisdiction from 12 miles to 200
miles, appeared to be a major blow to the arguments against uni-
lateralism. It soon became apparent however, that the FCMA
could not be supported by international law and was an obvious
treaty violation.'° As enacted, the FCMA violated articles 2, 6,
and 22 of the High Seas Convention.' Article 2 was violated
when the traditional freedom of fishing 52 was abridged and the
high seas subjected to national sovereignty.5 3 Similarly, article 6
zling. See id. It is almost inconceivable that the United States would declare a 200-mile
territorial sea.
148. For a brief analysis of the McDougal/Lasswell approach to international law as
applied to marine pollution and conservation issues, see Kindt, Prolegomenon to Marine Pol-
lution and the Law ofthe Sea:. An Overview ofthe Pollution Problem, I I ENVT'L L. 67 (1980).
149. 16 U.S.C. § 1801 etseq. (1977) [hereinafter cited as FCMA]; see Christy, The Fishery
Conservation And Management Act 0f1976. Management Objectives And The Distribution Of
Benefits And Costs, 52 WASH. L. REV. 657 (1977); U.S. Department of State, Fishery Conser-
vation Management Act, 78 DEP'T STATE BULL. 39-40 (Aug. 1978).
150. Moore, Foreign Policy and Fidelity to Law. The Anatomy of a Treaty Violation, 70
AM. J. INT'L L. 802 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Moore]; Statement by Deputy Secretary Ken-
neth Rush, before the Senate Committee on Commerce (May 3, 1974), reprinted in Depart-
ment Opposes Unilateral Extension of US Fisheries Jurisdiction, 70 DEP'T STATE BULL. 555,
556-58 (Apr.-June 1974) [hereinafter cited as Rush Statement]; Statement by Under Secre-
tary for Security Assistance Carlyle E. Maw, Special Representative for the President for the
Third U.N. Concerence on the Law of the Sea [hereinafter cited as Maw Statement], and
Statement by John Norton Moore, Chairman of the National Security Council Interagency
Task Force on the Law of the Sea and Deputy Special Representative of the President for the
Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea [hereinafter cited as Moore Statement], and
Statement by Thomas A. Clingan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries Af-
fairs [hereinafter cited as Clingan Statement] (Sept. 24, 1975), reprinted in Department Op-
poses Unilateral Establishment of 200-Mile US Fisheries Zone, 73 DEP'T STATE BULL. 623,
624-27 (Oct.-Dec. 1975).
151. Moore, supra note 150, at 805; High Seas Convention, supra note 114, arts. 2, 6, 22.
152. High Seas Convention, supra note 114, art. 2; see Rush Statement, supra note 150, at
557.
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of the High Seas Convention is violated since a ship "shall be sub-
ject to its [the registering country's] exclusive jurisdiction on the
high seas."' 54 Pursuant to article 22, a warship may board another
ship on the high seas only if it is suspected of conducting piracy,
engaging in the slave trade, or being the same nationality as the
warship (but refusing to fly its flag).'5 5 As these pronouncements
constitute customary international law,"' 6 these arguments would
apply afotiori to Ecuador's 200-mile claim of a territorial sea (and
similar claims) since the traditional jurisdictional rights and powers
associated with territorial seas are much more exclusive and oner-
ous than just a claim of fisheries jurisdiction.
The I1CMA also violates articles 1, 7, and 9-12 of the Fishing
Convention. 5 7 Article 1, paragraph 1, specifically enumerates the
right of different nationals "to engage in fishing on the high
seas," 5 8 and paragraph 2 imposes a duty upon countries "to adopt,
or to co-operate with other States in adopting, such measures for
their respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation
of the living resources of the high seas."' 5 9 Without cooperating
with other countries, and absent multilateral or bilateral agree-
ments, the United States can not restrict the fishermen of other
countries. Prior to the enactment of the FCMA, the United States
interim fisheries policy regarding pressure on domestic fish stocks
had focused on "negotiating yearly bilateral agreements (with the
Soviets, Japanese, Koreans, and others) and limited multilateral
agreements (within the International Commission for Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries, the International North Pacific Fisheries Com-
mission, and other commissions) to alleviate the pressure until a
comprehensive law of the sea treaty could be concluded."' 6 °
While the FCMA may have alleviated pressure on United
States fish stocks,' 6 ' the 200-mile limit created jurisdictional pres-
sures. The traditional cooperation between Canada and the United
States was blemished when Canada decided to abrogate the provi-
154. High Seas Convention, supra note 114, art. 6, para. I.
155. Id. art. 22, para. I. "If the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided that the
ship boarded has not committed any act justifying them, it shall be compensated for any loss
or damage that may have been sustained." Id. art. 22, para. 3. As a part of customary inter-
national law, this principle would apply to Ecuador's seizure of the tuna ships mentioned
earlier, even though Ecuador was not a member per se of the High Seas Convention.
156. See Moore, supra note 150, at 804.
157. Id. at 805; Fishing Convention, supra note 114, arts. 1, 7, 9-12.
158. Fishing Convention, supra note 114, art. 1, para. 1.
159. Id. art. i, para. 2.
160. Moore, supra note 150, at 803; see Maw Statement, supra note 150, at 623.
161. See Christy, supra note 149, at 658-64.
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sional effect of the 1978 interim fisheries agreement, which pro-
vided for reciprocal fishing in United States and Canadian 200-
mile fisheries zones. 16 2 This dispute arose because the FCMA con-
stitutes an invalid interim extension of jurisdiction, replacing the
valid interim bilateral and multilateral agreements formerly in ef-
fect. The United States Department of State cited this problem as
an illustration of "the weakness of interim reciprocal fisheries
agreements as compared with a long-term arrangement."' 63 This
statement is misleading, however, since the original interim agree-
ments governing United States fisheries were functioning relatively
well until enactment of the FCMA. Even so, the statement lends
tangential support to the proposition that an overall law of the sea
treaty would be beneficial.
Article 7 of the Fishing Convention "contemplates unilateral
coastal state conservation measures for protection of threatened
coastal stocks provided certain specified criteria, such as nondis-
crimination against foreign fisherman, a prior six-month effort to
find a negotiated solution, and submission of disputed actions to
impartial arbitration are met."'" While the Soviet Union, Japan,
and other fishing nations are not parties to the Fishing Convention,
"the prevailing legal opinion is that article 7 reflects customary in-
ternational law and that the United States could lawfully apply
these measures against nonparties."' 65 In fact, the Soviet Union,
Japan, and the United Kingdom indicated that they were receptive
to the article 7 approach, as opposed to the FCMA's unilateral ex-
tensions, and this approach received substantial support in the
United States Senate as an alternative to the FCMA.' 66 Articles 9
to 12 of the Fishing Convention, which specify the dispute settle-
ment mechanisms supporting article 7, are also ignored by the
FCMA. 1
67
Finally, the FCMA violated "a number of fishery bilateral and
limited multilateral agreements though most of these . . . [were]
relatively short-term .... ,68 In those areas in which there were
no express agreements, negotiations were pending, and the Japa-
162. U.S. Department of State, Oceans. U.S.-Canada Interim Reciprocal Fisheries Agree-
ment, 78 DEP'T STATE BULL. 38, 38 (Aug. 1978).
163. Id.
164. Moore, supra note 150, at 804; see Fishing Convention, supra note 114, art. 7, paras.
1-4.
165. Moore, supra note 150, at 804.
166. Id. at 804-05.
167. Fishing Convention, supra note 114, arts. 9-12.
168. Moore, supra note 150, at 805.
Vol. 10
22
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 10, No. 3 [1980], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol10/iss3/2
SPECIAL CLAIMS
nese, for example, had made significant concessions on halibut.
69
When the FCMA was passed there were at least 11 bilateral
fisheries agreements subject to renegotiation as well as regular
meetings of six multilateral fisheries commissions. 7 ° The goal of
the United States Department of State at that time was "to establish
through phased negotiations, rather than by unilateral action, the
functional equivalent of a 200-mile fisheries zone." 17' The FCMA,
in apparent disregard of these facts, constituted a unilateral exten-
sion of fisheries jurisdiction which terminated United States re-
sponsibility under several multilateral agreements and other
interim fisheries agreements. A violation of the international legal
principle of pacta sunt servanda 7 2 occurred not just once, but sev-
eral times.
The FCMA constituted a type of interim fisheries extension,
which replaced a series of valid interim agreements that were func-
tioning relatively well.' 7 3 "The Office of the Law of the Sea of the
Department of State estimated during late 1975 that as a result of
recent breakthroughs in fishery agreements only nine stocks out of
more than 100 off. . .[the United States] coasts were below maxi-
mum sustainable yield and continuing to decline as a result of
foreign fishing."'' 7' Even though some stocks such as haddock had
a zero quota, the FCMA was unnecessary as "there were other ap-
proaches which in combination with the fishery negotiations could
have dramatically improved protection of coastal fish stocks with-
out violating the legal obligations of the United States or severely
impairing overall United States ocean interests."'' 75 Negotiating
new agreements or modifying the existing fisheries agreements was
a viable alternative to the FCMA in 1976. These actions should
have been taken in conjunction with the provisions of the High
Seas Convention 7 6 and the Fishing Convention, 177 but passage of
the FCMA foreclosed the possibility of taking "legal" approaches
to the problem.
From a foreign policy standpoint, the FCMA was particularly
169. Rush Statement, supra note 150, at 555.
170. Clingan Statement, supra note 150, at 627.
171. Id.
172. Pacia sunt servanda means "agreements (of the parties) are to be observed."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
173. Rush Statement, supra note 150, at 555-58.
174. Moore, supra note 150, at 803; see Rush Statement, supra note 150, at 555.
175. Moore, supra note 150, at 803.
176. See notes 151-56 supra and accompanying text.
177. See notes 157-67 supra and accompanying text.
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damaging to the United States. Before passage there was little
doubt that "[t]he unilateral extension of jurisdiction required by the
bill would have serious foreign policy implications which could cre-
ate political tensions internationally."' 7 s In 1974 Deputy Secretary
Kenneth Rush testified before the Senate Committee on Commerce
that a potential FCMA "could seriously prejudice the achievement
of satisfactory resolutions of the fisheries and other issues at the
Law of the Sea Conference; it would be harmful, on a long-term
basis, to all United States fishing interests; and, it would be a viola-
tion of international law."' 7 9 After enactment of the FCMA it was
again predicted that it would have a negative impact on the foreign
policy of the United States.
[Tihe bill would undercut the cardinal tenet of United States
oceans policy: no illegal unilateral oceans claims. As the largest
user of the world's oceans the United States has the most to lose
by a pattern of unrestrained national extensions. If we can make
such claims over others' oceans interests others can make their
own claims over ours. This is not merely an imaginary horrible.
In only three months following passage of the 200-mile bill, Ca-
nada, France, Guatemala, Japan, Spain, India, Sri Lanka, Mex-
ico, Senegal, and other nations have announced or have begun
planning new unilateral oceans claims. The claim by Senegal to
a 150-mile territorial sea, among other claims, has been specifi-
cally justified by reference to the United States action; .... iso
History has demonstrated that this prediction was essentially cor-
rect, and subsequent analysis has revealed its remarkable accuracy
with regard to the specific countries mentioned:
a. in 1977 Canada claimed a 200-mile fisheries zone' 8 1 as part
of a 200-mile economic resources zone;'
82
b. in 1976 France claimed a 200-mile economic zone;'
3
c. in 1976 Guatemala claimed a 200-mile economic zone; 84
178. Rush Statement, supra note 150, at 556.
179. Id.
180. Moore, supra note 150, at 805.
181. In January of 1977, Canada issued an order under the Territorial Sea and Fishing
Zone Act of 1964 (as amended in 1970) which delimited 200-mile fishing zones on the Atlan-
tic and Pacific coasts. Fishing Zones of Canada (Zones 4 and 6) Order, 110 Can. Gaz., Extra
No. 101 (Nov. 1, 1976), as authorized by Territorial Sea and Fishing Zone Act of 1964, CAN.
REV. STAT. c. T-7 (1970), as amendedCAN. REV. STAT. c. 45 (1st Supp. 1970). A similar 200-
mile zone was established in the Arctic in March of 1977. Fishing Zones of Canada (Zone 6)
Order (Mar. 1, 1977).
182. Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 42, at 357.
183. See id. at 394.
184. Legislative Decree No. 20-76 of 9 June 1976 Concerning the Breadth of the Territo-
rial Sea and the Establishment of an Exclusive Economic Zone, art. 3 (Guatemala), reprinted
Vol. 10
24
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 10, No. 3 [1980], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol10/iss3/2
SPECIAL CLAIMS
d. in 1977 Japan declared a 200-mile fishery zone;
e. in 1978 Spain claimed a 200-mile economic zone;'
8 6
f. in 1976 India asserted a 200-mile economic zone' 87 to coin-
cide with a 12-mile territorial sea, a 24-mile contiguous zone,
and a 24-mile fisheries zone;1
88
g. in 1976 and January of 1977 Sri Lanka asserted a 200-mile
economic zone, 189 a 12-mile territorial sea, a 24-mile contig-
uous zone, and a 200-mile pollution zone;' 90
h. in 1976 Mexico established a 200-mile economic zone;'
9 1
and
i. in 1976 Senegal claimed a 150-mile territorial sea and a 200-
mile economic zone.1
92
Prior to the FCMA there were only about a dozen 200-mile
claims and none of these claims was by a current maritime power.
In 1975 there were only three new 200-mile claims. Then on April
13, 1976 President Ford signed the bill enacting the FCMA.
193
This event served as the catalyst which triggered major unilateral
claims by other countries, and by the end of 1976 another nineteen
countries had asserted 200-mile jurisdictional extensions.' 94  In
1977 an additional thirty-six countries asserted 200-mile claims and
in 1978, ten more countries extended jurisdiction to 200-miles.' 95 It
would be erroneous to contend that these 200-mile extensions
would have occurred anyway and that the FCMA merely antici-
pated a trend toward 200-mile claims. The paucity of 200-mile
in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/19, at 64 (prelim. issue 1978); see Krueger & Nordquist,
supra note 42, at 395.
185. Enforcement Order of June 17, 1977 of Law No. 31 of May 2, 1977 on Provisional
Measures Relating to the Fishing Zone (Japan), reprinted in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/19,
at 235 (prelim. issue 1978); see Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 42, at 392.
186. See Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 42, at 394.
187. The Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and Other
Maritime Zones Act (Act No. 80 of 1976), § 7, vol. 63, pt. 755, All India Reporter [A.I.R.]
270-71 (1976), reprinted in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/19, at 81 (prelim. issue 1978).
188. Id; see Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 42, at 397.
189. Proclamation by the President of the Republic of Sri Lanka of 15 January 1977 in
Pursuance of Maritime Zones Law No. 22 of 1976, reprinted in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/
19, at 130-35 (prelim. issue 1978); see Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 42, at 393.
190. See Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 42, at 393, 399 n.24.
191. Decree of 26 January 1976 Adding a New Paragraph 8 to Article 27 of the Constitu-
tion of the United Mexican States (entered into force June 5, 1976), reprinted in U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.B/19, at 244 (prelim. issue 1978); see Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 42, at
395.
192. See Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 42, at 391.
193. See Statement of the President Upon Signing the 200-Mile Fishing Legislation, 12
WEEKLY COMP. OF PRESS. Doc. 644 (Apr. 13, 1976).
194. See Table II infra.
195. Id.
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claims made before April of 1976, and the degree and frequency of
claims made after April of 1976, demonstrate that the FCMA was
the major cause of approximately 65 unilateral extensions of juris-
diction-most of which were more comprehensive and onerous
than those extensions asserted via the FCMA. 19 6 An analysis of
trends and conditioning factors before 1976 affirms this conclu-
sion."' Regrettably, the United States Congress did not accept the
following analysis of the Department of State.
The United States has consistently opposed unilateral
claims by other countries. Moreover, because we view a prolifer-
ation of unilateral claims at this time as being seriously detri-
mental to a successful Law of the Sea Conference, we have urged
other nations to hold back on unilateral claims. Indeed, we have
even indicated to nations with interim problems that we will be
glad to help them resolve these problems on a bilateral or multi-
lateral basis.
For the United States to extend its fisheries jurisdiction uni-
laterally at this time would seriously impair our credibility inter-
nationally. It would also weaken the hand of our negotiations
and reduce our ability to negotiate a law of the sea treaty which
meets our objectives. 198
The FCMA also undermined the Law of the Sea (LOS) negoti-
ations in a number of subtle ways.' 99 The fear that the United
States would enact a bill like the FCMA was a major bargaining
lever which the United States used to support its position of main-
taining a maximum amount of "freedom of navigation." In addi-
tion, the 200-mile fisheries claims by PEC were discounted because
of the traditional refusal of the United States to enact a bill like the
FCMA. Conversely, the PEC claims obtained a semblance of legiti-
macy only after the enactment of the FCMA and the concomitant
unilateral extensions made by other countries. United States lead-
ership in this area was not only diminished, but the policies of those
nations opposing unilateral extensions of jurisdiction were under-
mined.2"' Although the United States "endorsement of the 200-mile
limit . . . [was] unlikely to and has not resulted in the collapse of
the negotiations,"' ' the result was that the United States was "rob-
196. See Tables 11-VII infra.
197. See Martens, supra note 1, at 531.
198. Rush Statement, supra note 150, at 556-57; see Maw Statement, supra note 150, at
623.
199. Moore, supra note 150, at 805; Moore Statement, supra note 150, at 625-26.
200. See Martens, supra note 1, at 531-51.
201. Moore, supra note 150, at 805.
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bing Peter to pay PEC."2 °2 Passage of the FCMA therefore en-
hanced the PEC claims, while undercutting the most promising
negotiations in the 20-year history of the tuna disputes.20 3
It was also predicted that the FCMA could "increase the po-
tential for conflict around the world,"2" that it "could lead to a
risky confrontation with the Soviet Union, Japan, or other na-
tions'2°5 fishing off United States coasts, and that the "potential for
international incidents, particularly with such nations as Japan and
the Soviet Union, would be grave. ' ' 206 This prediction came true
when two Soviet vessels fishing within 200-miles of the United
States coast were arrested by the United States Coast Guard, forced
into Boston harbor, and charged with violating the FCMA.2 °7 Al-
though the Soviet Union did not retaliate with severe measures,
they did subsequently establish their own 200-mile fishery zone.20 8
Even without confrontation, it was hypothesized that the
FCMA would significantly harm United States relations with na-
tions fishing within the jurisdiction of the FCMA. Japan, with its
reliance on fishing, was particularly incensed at the unilateral
FCMA.2° Japanese Prime Minister Miki protested passage of the
FCMA directly to President Ford.210 Shortly thereafter, in 1977,
Japan provisionally established a 200-mile fishing zone,2 1 which
came into force 2 months later.21 2
202. See notes 98-148 supra and accompanying text.
203. Moore, supra note 150, at 806; see Moore Statement, supra note 150, at 625.
204. Maw Statement, supra note 150, at 624.
205. Moore, supra note 150, at 806; see Moore Statement, supra note 150, at 625; Rush
Statement, supra note 150, at 555-56.
206. Rush Statement, supra note 150, at 556.
207. See A Little Stink About a Lot offish, TIME, Apr. 25, 1977, at 42, 47.
208. See Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. of December 10,
1976 on Provisional Measures to Conserve Living Resources and Regulate Fishing in the Sea
Areas Adjacent to the Coast of the U.S.S.R., reprinted in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/19, at
264 (prelim. issue 1978); Decision No. 163 of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. of
February 24, 1977 on the Introduction of Provisional Measures to Protect the Living Re-
sources and Regulate Fishing in the Areas of the Pacific and Arctic Oceans adjacent to the
Coastline of the U.S.S.R., reprinted in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/19, at 266 (prelim. issue
1978); Regulations on the Protection of Fishery and Other Living Resources in the Coastal
Waters of the U.S.S.R. (1977), reprinted in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/19, at 266 (prelim.
issue 1978); Decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. of March 22,
1977 on the System for the Application of Article 7 of the Presidium Decree of December 10,
1976, reprinted in U.N. Do. ST/LEG/SER.B/19, at 270 (prelim. issue 1978).
209. Moore, supra note 150, at 806.
210. Id.
211. Law No. 31 of May 2, 1977 on Provisional Measures Relating to the Fishery Zone
(Japan), as amendedLaw No. 83 of Nov. 29, 1977, art. 3(3), reprinted in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/
SER.B/19, at 277 (prelim. issue 1978).
212. Enforcement Order of June 17, 1977 of Law No. 31 of May 2, 1977 on Provisional
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Subsequent to these events, the United States utilized a provi-
sion of the FCMA to negotiate several bilateral "Agreements Con-
cerning Fisheries off the Coasts of the United States," which are
popularly referred to as "Governing International Fishery Agree-
ments" (GIFAs). To the extent that other countries are parties to
GIFAs, the FCMA is valid under international law. Even so, the
trend of other countries to extend unilaterally their jurisdictions
was not noticeably obviated by GIFAs.
It was further postulated that the FCMA "would undermine
United States efforts to obtain binding international conservation
standards and other reasonable restraints on coastal na-
tions. .. ."" In 1974 it was predicted that "unilateral action in
this area by the United States could trigger damaging unilateral
claims by other nations, thereby affecting United States national
interests in navigation and overflight, protection of the marine
evironment, and marine scientific research."2 4 Secretary of State
Kissinger, who did little to prevent passage of the FCMA,21 5 con-
ceded that the FCMA was a "unilateral extension" by the United
States that "would lead to a set of unilateral moves by other coun-
tries." '2 1 6 The 200-mile unilateral claims now asserted by approxi-
mately 81 countries 2' 7 effectively destroy the traditional concept of
"freedom of navigation," and seriously harm the United States
"opportunity to achieve international agreement accommodating
vital security interests, strategic mobility on the oceans, and free-
dom of navigation for the movement of commercial cargoes, such
as oil. .. .28 If the United States and other countries do not
adopt the more moderate 200-mile provisions embodied in the
ICNT/Rev.2, then the major maritime powers are necessarily going
to be driven into conflict with those countries asserting restrictive
200-mile extensions, such as 200-mile territorial seas. This problem
Measures Relating to the Fishery Zone (Japan), reprintedin U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/19,
at 235 (prelim. issue 1978).
213. Moore, supra note 150, at 806.
214. Rush Statement, supra note 150, at 557 (emphasis added).
215. Moore, supra note 150, at 806; see News Conference of Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger, at Elmendorf Air Force Base; in Anchorage, Alaska (Oct. 18, 1975), reprinted in
Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Anchorage, Alaska, October 18, 73 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 686, 687 (Oct.-Dec. 1975) [hereinafter cited as News Conference].
216. Remarks by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, following a meeting with U.N. Sec-
retary General Kurt Waldheim, at U.N. Headquarters in New York City (Sept. 2, 1976),
reprinted in Secretary Kissinger Meets with UN. Secretary General Waldheim, 75 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 399, 401 (July-Sept. 1975); see News Conference, supra note 215, at 686-87.
217. See Table II infra.
218. Moore Statement, supra note 150, at 626.
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will be exacerbated over time if greater numbers of countries claim
restrictive 200-mile extensions as part of "an uncontrollable pattern
of inconsistent claims."' 2t 9 The FCMA may have forced the United
States into accepting a potential LOS treaty for the "freedom of
navigation" provisions which are vital to United States national se-
curity interests. This may occur regardless of the other potential
treaty provisions, such as unfavorable provisions involving deep
seabed mining. If the ICNT/Rev.2 provisions reached consen-
sus as they now stand, and if Congress was forced to accept or re-
ject the LOS treaty at this juncture, there is little doubt that the
FCMA would have increased the pressure on the United States to
accept unfavorable provisions and ratify the overall LOS treaty. In
any event, the FCMA has limited the options available to the
United States and has restricted the flexibility which the United
States needs in the LOS negotiations. As such, the FCMA "may




NUMBER OF 200-MILES CLAIMS BY YEARS
Accumulated
Year Number of Claims/Year Claims










219. Maw Statement, supra note 150, at 624.
220. See Moore, In Search of Common Nodules at UNCLOS 11, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 1
(1977); Moore, Salvaging UNCLOS III from the Rocks of the Deep Seabed, 17 VA. J. INT'L
L. 1 (1976). For an in-depth compromise to the current deadlock over deep seabed mining
issues, see J. MOORE, R. WOLFRUM, P. STOPFORD, & J. STENDER, DEEP SEABED MINING IN
THE LAW OF THE SEA NEGOTIATION (II): TOWARD A BALANCED DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM 2-
280 (Center for Oceans Law & Pol'y, Mar. 1978). See also Martens, supra note 1, at 545-47.
221. Moore, supra note 150, at 802.
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TABLE III











































Iceland 1975 4 200
Italy 1974 12 200
Netherlands 1889 3 200
Latin America
Brazil 1970 200 200
Chile 1947 3 200
Columbia 1975 200
Ecuador 1970 200






Southern Asia & the
Middle East
Iran 1959 12 50
(plus may establish
100-mile conservation zone)
Note: None of these pre-1976 claims was by a current maritime power.




















































Sources: Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 42, at 373, 390-99; see Fisher, supra note 58, at
667.
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Sources: Krueger &.Nordquist, supra note 42, at 373, 390-99; see Fisher, supra note 58, at
667.
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TABLE VII
MODERATE JURISDICTIONAL CLAIMS As OF 1978
Territorial/Contiguous Fishery











China, Peoples Rep. of 1958 12








Western Samoa 1977 12
Europe




Malta 1975 6 12
Monaco 1973 12
Romania 1951 12




























Country Date Sea Zone Zone
Saudi Arabia 1958 12
Syria 1963 12
Turkey 1964 6 12
United Arab Emirates 3
Sources: Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 42, at 373, 390-99; see Fisher, supra note 58, at
667.
TABLE VIII
AREAS APPROPRIATED BY THE PROPOSED 200-MILE
ECONOMIC ZONE
Approximate Area Appropriated

















*These countries are listed in decreasing order by the size of the appropriated area.
Source: Alexander & Hodgson, supra note 36, at 574-75.
Note: Regardless of their justifications, huge areas of the sea are appropriated by these
claims.
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B. Claims Involving Unilateral Extensions of Jurisdiction over
Marine Pollution
1. Trends in Decision. Marine pollution claims traditionally
involve oil and radioactive elements. "The two principal possibili-
ties of significant oceanic pollution. . . [were] from the discharge
of oil from ships and from the deposit of radioactive materials
through weapons tests and waste disposal." '222 Since the concern
over oil pollution 223 preceded the concern over nuclear pollution
224
by approximately twenty-five years, the focus of the present analy-
sis will be on oil pollution.
International concern over oil pollution "appears to have
originated in the decade after World War I when first the United
States, and then the League of Nations undertook to foster agree-
ment upon measures to combat pollution. '225 In 1926 an interna-
tional conference dealing with "oil discharge" (the old term for
vessel-source pollution) was held in Washington, but the agreement
drafted at the conference was never ratified and interest waned un-
til after World War 11.226 "After the United Nations was estab-
lished in 1945,227 it appeared that the subject of pollution of the
seas would be dealt with by the proposed Intergovernmental Mari-
time Consultative Organization (IMCO)";228 however, thirteen
years elapsed before IMCO was established in 1958.229 The first
concrete achievement occurred in 1954 when the London confer-
ence on oil pollution produced the Convention for the Prevention
222. PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 6, at 848; see D. BOWETT, THE LAW OF THE SEA 45-50
(1967).
223. PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 6, at 848-5 1.
224. Id. at 852-67.
225. Id. at 849; Comment, International Law And Canadian Arctic Pollution Control, 38
ALB. L. REV. 921, 924 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Pollution Control]; see Draft Convention,
League of Nations, Communications and Transit Organization, Pollution of the Sea by Oil,
Report on the Second Session of the Committee of Experts 8 (L.N. Doc. No.
e.499.M.235.1935.VIII); League of Nations, Communications and Transit Organization, Pol-
lution of the Sea by Oil (L.N. Doc. No. A.20.1935.VIII); Gold, Pollution of the Sea and Inter-
national Law: A Canadian Perspective, 3 J. MARITIME L. & COM. 13, 18 (1971). See also
Final Report of the Preliminary Conference on Oil Pollution of Navigable Waters, in I FOR.
REL. U.S. 1926, 238 (1941).
226. Gold, supra note 225, at 18; Pollution Control, supra note 225, at 924; see PUBLIC
ORDER, supra note 6, at 850.
227. See The Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of
Justice, 59 Stat. 1031 (1945), T.S. No. 933 (effective Oct. 24, 1945).
228. Pollution Control, supra note 225, at 924; see Convention on the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization, signed Mar. 6, 1948, [1958] 1 U.S.T. 621, T.I.A.S. 4044,
289 U.N.T.S. 48; Gold, supra note 225, at 19.
229. Pollution Control, supra note 225, at 924.
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of the Pollution of the Sea by Oil (hereinafter referred to as London
Convention).23 ° The major shortcoming of the London Convention
was that all enforcement was left to the country in which the vessel
was registered, not to the country aggrieved. This provision en-
couraged vessels to sail under "flags of convenience," that is, to reg-
ister either in those countries not bound by the London Convention
or in countries which place few restrictions on their vessels.23'
The Geneva Conventions232 of 1958 established some needed
policy-oriented principles in the area of marine pollution. Article
24, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone233 (hereinafter referred to as Territorial Sea Con-
vention) states:
1. In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the
coastal State may exercise control necessary to:
(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or
sanitary regulations within its territory or territorial sea;
(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed
within its territory or territorial sea.
234
While "sanitary regulations" have been construed as including
marine pollution,235 however, the maximum limit for the contigu-
ous zone is limited to twelve miles from the territorial sea baseline
under article 24, paragraph 2.236 "Any argument that pollution
problems were not contemplated by the Law of the Sea Conven-
tions, and that article 24(2) of the Territorial Sea Convention is
thus not pertinent to the issue of contiguous zones established for
the specific purpose of pollution prevention, seems refuted by the
express reference to oil pollution in article 24 of the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the High Seas, drafted at the same conference as the
Territorial Sea Convention .... ,,23' Article 24 of the High Seas
Convention states:
Every State shall draw up regulations to prevent pollution
of the seas by the discharge of oil from ships or pipelines or re-
sulting from the exploitation and exploration of the seabed and
230. May 12, 1954, 1196113 U.S.T. 2989, T.1.A.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3, as amended
May 18 & June 28, 1967, [1966] 2 U.S.T. 1523, T.I.A.S. No. 6109, 600 U.N.T.S. 332.
231. See Bilder, The Candian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. New Stresses On
The Law Of The Sea, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1, 15-16, 34 n.120 (1970); Pollution Control, supra
note 225, at 925. See also Gold, supra note 225, at 19.
232. See supra note 114.
233. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 114.
234. Id. at art. 24, para. I (emphasis added).
235. See Bilder, supra note 23 1, at 14.
236. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 114, art. 24, para. 2.
237. Bilder, supra note 231, at 14-15.
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its subsoil, taking account of existing treatypro visions on the sub-
ject.
2 38
The reference to "existing treaty provisions" might be directed
at the three other 1958 Genva Conventions. The language how-
ever, would indicate that it is probably directed at the 1954 London
Convention, the only major pollution convention then in exist-
ence.23 9 In addition, article 25 of the High Seas Convention dealt
with radioactive materials:
1. Every State shall take measures to prevent pollution of the
seas from the dumping of radio-active waste, taking into account
any standards and regulations which may be formulated by the
competent international organizations.
2. All States shall co-operate with the competent international
organizations in taking measures for the prevention of pollution
of the seas or air space above, resulting from any activities with
radio-active materials or other harmful agents.24
The separate treatment of oil pollution2 41 indicates that "oil" was
not to be included within the "harmful agents" provision of article
25.242 Indeed, the High Seas Convention focused on the potential
harm caused by nuclear fallout, and was not aimed at being an
effective agent for policing marine pollution.243 The Fishing Con-
vention 244 and the Continental Shelf Convention 245 paid even less
regard to marine pollution issues.
IMCO was established in 1958, and in July, 1959, Copenhagen
hosted an international conference on oil pollution to recommend
changes in the London Convention. 246 However, the London Con-
vention was not amended until 1962 when the Second Conference
on Oil Pollution was held in London.247 The 1962 amendments
were finally ratified in 1967, extending the effectiveness of the
London Convention and subjecting a greater number of vessels to
its control.248
238. High Seas Convention, supra note 114, art. 24 (emphasis added).
239. Bilder, supra note 231, at 15; see PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 6, at 851; Gold, supra
note 225, at 20.
240. High Seas Convention, supra note 114, art. 25; see PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 6, at
867; Pollution Control, supra note 225, at 925-26.
241. High Seas Convention, supra note 114, art. 24.
242. Id. art. 25; Pollution Control supra note 225, at 926.
243. Pollution Control, supra note 225, at 926.
244. See Fishing Convention, supra note 114, art. 4.
245. See Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 114, art. 2.
246. Gold, supra note 225, at 19; see Alexander & Hodgson, supra note 36, at 591-92.
247. Pollution Control, supra note 225, at 926.
248. Gold, supra note 225, at 20; Pollution Control supra note 225, at 926-27.
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International concern over marine pollution was stimulated by
the well-publicized Torrey Canyon incident. In March, 1967, the
tanker S S. Torrey Canyon went aground on the Cornwall coast of
England spreading over 80,000 tons of crude oil249 up to 225 miles
away. 250 Following the Torrey Canyon incident oil spills occurred
with increasing regularity. In 1968 the tanker Ocean Eagle broke
up in Puerto Rican waters. 251 The offshore oil well blowout near
Santa Barbara in 1969 polluted 400 square miles of ocean and 40
miles of the California coast. 2 The Delian Apollon ran aground in
Tampa Bay in 1970 spilling 10,000 gallons of fuel oil and contami-
nating 100 square miles of ocean.253 Oil spills still occur with regu-
larity, and an additional problem is created by their size as
evidenced by: the Amoco Cadiz which dumped 1.3 million barrels
of oil on France's Brittany coast in 1978, the 1.5 million barrels of
oil spilled in 1979 when two tankers collided near Trinidad and
Tobago, and the Pemex blowout in Campeche Bay which released
approximately 3.1 million barrels and created an oil slick 500 miles
long and 50 miles wide.254 For the international environmentalist,
the Torrey Canyon incident was a "blessing in disguise," as it ended
the laissez-faire attitude of goverments toward oil pollution255and
stimulated attempts to curb marine pollution.
The Torrey Canyon incident prompted IMCO to convene an
extraordinary session in May, 1967.256 Until Torrey Canyon,
IMCO had been limited to technical matters affecting international
shipping, leaving the legal and policy considerations to the Comit6
Maritime International (CMI), an international organization
founded in 1867 by various maritime associations, involving mari-
time insurance, cargo, and chartering interests.257 After 1967, the
private shipping interests represented by CMI and the public inter-
249. Gold, supra note 225, at 21-22; see E. COWAN, OIL AND WATER: THE TORREY
CANYON DISASTER (1968); C. GILL, F. BOOKER, & T. SOPER, THE WRECK OF THE TORREY
CANYON (1967); Nanda, The "Torrey Canyon" Disaster.- Some Legal Aspects, 44 DENVER
L.J. 400 (1967).
250. Gold, supra note 225, at 22.
251. A. REITZE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ch. 4, at 78 (2d ed. 1972).
252. Environment.- Tragedy in Oil, TIME, Feb. 14, 1968, at 23-25; see Baldwin, The Santa
Barbara Oil Spill, 42 COLO. L. REV. 33 (1970).
253. REITZE, supra note 25 1, ch. 4, at 78.
254. Beck & Henkoff, Texas.- The Oil Spill Is Coming, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 13, 1979, at 24;
see The Great Gulf Oil Spill Wrangle, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 10, 1979, at 26; When a Giant Oil
Slick Hits U.S. Shores, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 20, 1979, at 50.
255. Gold, supra note 225, at 22.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 22-23.
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ests represented by IMCO began to cooperate with each other, re-
sulting in the International Legal Conference on Marine Pollution
Damage, being held in Brussels in November 1969.258 Two con-
ventions emerged from the conference. One Convention was the
Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of
Oil Pollution Casualties259 (hereinafter referred to as Intervention
Convention), which allowed a country to intervene to protect its
coastline if a maritime casualty could reasonably be expected to
result in major damage. 260 The Intervention Convention has been
called the "public law convention" of the Brussels Conference, with
the "private law convention" being the Convention on Civil Liabil-
ity for Oil Pollution Damage26' (hereinafter referred to as Brussels
Liability Convention).262 The United States has ratified the Inter-
vention Convention which entered into force in 1975, but it has not
yet ratified the Brussels Liability Convention. A complement to the
Brussels Liability Convention was the Convention on the Establish-
ment of the International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution
Damage263 (hereinafter referred to as Fund Convention), and al-
though it was adopted in 1971, it has not been ratified by the
United States.264 The Fund Convention limits the shipowner's lia-
bility, and if the Brussels Liability Convention does not adequately
compensate the injured parties, the Fund Convention provides lim-
ited recovery via the International Oil Pollution Compensation
Fund.265
There are two significant private agreements relating to oil
spills which were negotiated between the major oil companies and
the owners of the oil tankers. In 1969 the Tanker Owners Volun-
tary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollu-
tion 266(TOVALOP) was negotiated to compensate national
258. Id. at 23-24; Note, Federal Common Law and Ocean Pollution, 8 ENVT'L L. 1, 7
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Common Law]; Pollution Control, supra note 225, at 927.
259. Done Nov. 29, 1969, [1975] 1 U.S.T. 765, T.I.A.S. No. 8068.
260. Pollution Control, supra note 225, at 927; see Bilder, supra note 231, at 16-18.
261. Done Nov. 29, 1969, reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 45 (1970); see Pollution Con-
trol supra note 225, at 927-28.
262. Bilder, supra note 231, at 16-17.
263. Done Dec. 18, 1971, reprinted in II INT'J. LEGAL MATS. 284 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Fund Convention].
264. See Common Law, supra note 258, at 9. Professor Goldie expressed his opinion that
the Senate will give its advice and consent to the ratification. See Goldie, Liabilityfor Oil
Pollution Disasters." International Law and the Delimitation of Competences in a Federal Pol-
icy, 6 J. MARITIME L. & COM. 303 (1975).
265. See Fund Convention, supra note 263, arts. II & IV.
266. Signed Jan. 7, 1969, reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 497 (1969).
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governments for the costs of cleaning up oil spills - if the tankers
were negligent. 267  Additional coverage was provided under the
Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for
Oil Pollution268 (CRISTAL), which covers governmental costs,
damages to private parties, and environmental damage to land or
within territorial seas.269 When the Fund Convention enters into
force, CRISTAL will expire. 27" A list of the major international
documents relevant to this area are given in Appendix II.
2. Recent Claims and Policy Arguments. The first significant
claim involving a unilateral extension on the basis of marine pollu-
tion was prompted by the Torrey Canyon accident. In 1971 the
United Kingdom enacted the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act,
27 1
which prohibited the discharge of certain oils both inside and
outside its territorial sea.272 The second significant claim occured
in 1972 when the Althing (Parliament) of Iceland unanimously ap-
proved its well-known fisheries resolution.273 This resolution au-
thorized Iceland's Government to "declare unilaterally a special
jurisdiction with regard to pollution in the seas surrounding Ice-
land. 274
Perhaps the most famous unilateral extension of pollution ju-
risdiction occurred shortly after the Humble Oil and Refining
Company275 sent a modified ice-breaking supertanker, the S.S.
Manhattan, through the Northwest Passage in 1969.276 The pur-
pose of the voyage was to demonstrate that ice-breaking supertank-
ers could transport oil from the Alaskan oil fields to the east coast
of the United States.277 Canada was unimpressed by the voyage,
and instead, was concerned about potential oil pollution of the
hyper-sensitive Arctic.278  The Canadian Parliament became
267. Id. art. IV(A)-(B). See also Gold, supra note 225, at 30-36.
268. Signed Jan. 14, 1971, reprintedin 10 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 137 (1971).
269. Id. art. IV.
270. Id. art III(C)(I). See also Gold, supra note 225, at 30-31.
271. C.60 (1971), reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 849 (1972).
272. See id. § § 1-2.
273. Resolution of February 15, 1972, of the Althing on Fisheries Jurisdiction, reprinted
in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 643 (1972).
274. Id. § 5.
275. The Humble Oil and Refining Company is a subsidiary of the Standard Oil Com-
pany of New Jersey.
276. See Smith, Tanker Leaves to Conquer Fabled Northwest, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1969,
at 1, col. 3; Smith, Northwest Passage Opened, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1969, at 1, col. 3.
277. Bilder, supra note 231, at 3-4.
278. Id. at 4-5; Note, Candian and Soviet Arctic Policy.- An Icy Receptionfor the Law of
the Sea? 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 609, 612 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Canadian Policy].
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alarmed when in February of 1970 a Liberian tanker, the Arrow,
ran aground in Chadabucto Bay off Nova Scotia and polluted the
Canadian coast.27 9 As a result, the Parliament passed the Arctic
Waters Pollution Prevention Act,28° (hereinafter referred to as Pol-
lution Act) which quickly became the object of heated international
debate.28" ' Most nations contended that the 100-mile pollution ju-
risdiction asserted by Canada via its Pollution Act was patently ille-
gal under existing international law.28 2 Canada "struck a blow
against pollution and for . ..[the] crusade for the environment,
but it .. . [was] a blow also at international law and its law of
lawmaking."2"3
Most of the debate involving the marine pollution justification
for extending jurisdiction has centered around the Pollution Act of
Canada, but there have been other unilateral extensions. A 1971
Soviet statute28 4 claimed jurisdiction to suspend navigation in the
Arctic which threatened "to pollute the marine environment or the
northern coasts of the Soviet Union.
'28 5
In 1959 Iran passed legislation authorizing a 100-mile "conser-
vation zone," which was different from a fishing zone and which
279. Grounded Tanker, Leaking Oil, Spills Off Nova Scotia, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1970, at
78, col. 1; Gold, supra note 225, at 32-33; see Bilder, supra note 231, at 4.
280. CAN. REV. STAT. c.2 (lst Supp. 1970).
281. See Bilder, supra note 231, at 1; Gold, supra note 225, at 13; Henkin, ArcticAnti-
Pollution.- Does Canada Make-or Break-International Law, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 131 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Henkin]; M'Gonigle, Unilateralism and International Law: The Arctic
Waters Pollution Prevention Act, 34 U. TORONTO FACULTY L. REV. 180 (1976); Canadian
Policy, supra note 278, at 609. See generally Thomson, The Law of the Sea-With Special
Reference to Canada; A Select Bibliography 4-6 (Pamphlet of the Norman Paterson School
of Int'l Aff., Carleton U., 1976).
282. Bilder, supra note 231, at 18; Henkin, supra note 281, at 135-36; see Canadian Policy,
supra note 278, at 612-16, 629-30. Contra, Gold, supra note 225, at 36-39; M'Gonigle, supra
note 281, at 196-98.
283. Henkin, supra note 281, at 135.
284. Law of Sept. 16, 1971, [1971] 1 Sobr. Post Soy. Min. S.S.S.R. Item 124, as translated
in 1 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 645 (1972).
285. Butler, Pollution Control and the Soviet Arctic, 21 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 557, 559
(1972). See also Kolbasov, Legal Protection of the Environment in the USSR, I EARTH L.J.
51 (1975). Canadian and Soviet claims for protecting the Arctic are now specifically covered
in article 234 of the ICNT/Rev.2 which states:
Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws
and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from
vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where
particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas
for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and
pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible dis-
turbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and regulations shall have due re-
gard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine environment
based on the best available scientific evidence.
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could be established at the discretion of the Iranian Government.
2 6
The Declaration of Santo Domingo issued in 1972287 included ju-
risdiction over marine pollution within its concept of a 200-mile
"patrimonial sea."288 In 1973 Kenya submitted draft articles to the
Seabed Committee of UNCLOS III which specified a 200-mile eco-
nomic zone including coastal State jurisdiction over pollution pre-
vention.2 s 9 The Kenyan proposal was adopted by the Organization
of African Unity (OAU) as the official position of the OAU. 29 0 Al-
though the Santo Domingo Declaration and the OAU position
were not expressly unilateral extensions, they codified the trend of
their individual members toward adding jurisdiction over marine
pollution to their 200-mile extensions.
In 1976 Guatemala established a 200-mile economic zone
29 1
stating that pending future enactment of marine pollution provi-
sions and other provisions, the laws and regulations governing the
territorial sea would apply to the economic zone.2 92 During the
same year India asserted a 200-mile jurisdictional zone to protect
the marine environment as part of its 200-mile economic zone.29 3
In January, 1977, Sri Lanka proclaimed a 200-mile economic
zone294 which included jurisdiction "to control and prevent pollu-
tion and to preserve the ecological balance of the pollution preven-
tion zone. 29 5 In addition, New Zealand claimed the right to a 200-
286. Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 42, at 397, 399 n.27.
287. See notes 89-90 supra and accompanying text.
288. Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 42, at 327.
289. Draft Articles on Exclusive Economic Zone Concept, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/
S.C.II/L.10 (1972), reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 33 (1973).
290. Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 42, at 328; see Declaration of the Organization of
African Unity on the Issues of the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/33, at 3; OFFI-
CIAL RECORDS OF THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 63
(1975).
291. Legislative Decree No. 20-76 of 9 June 1976 Concerning the Breadth of the Territo-
rial Sea and the Establishment of an Exclusive Economic Zone (Guatemala), reprinted in
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/19, at 64 (prelim. issue 1978).
292. Id. art. 5; see Decree No. 1470 of 23 June 1961 (Guatemala), reprinted in part in
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/15, at 637-38 (1970); Government Resolution of 16 August 1962
containing the regulations for applying the Act concerning the rational exploitation of the
country's fishing resources, reprinted in part in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/15, at 638-39
(1970).
293. The Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and Other
Maritime Zones Act (Act No. 80 of 1976), § 7(6), vol. 63, pt. 755, All India Reporter [A.I.R.]
270-71 (1976), reprinted in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/19, at 81 (prelim. issue 1978).
294. Maritime Zones Law No. 22 of 1976 § 7(2), repriMted in part in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/
SER.B/19, at 130, 134 (prelim. issue 1978).
295. Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 42, at 347.
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mile economic zone in 1977,296 which included the power to protect
the marine environment within that zone.297
The unilateral claims after 1973 were based primarily on con-
cepts which developed at UNCLOS III. Under article 45, para-
graph 1, of the Informal Single Negotiating Text 2 98 (SNT) of
UNCLOS III, the concept of the 200-mile economic zone incorpo-
rated a grant to each coastal State of "jurisdiction with regard to
the preservation of the marine environment, including pollution
control and abatement; .... "299 Article 46 of the SNT provided
that jurisdiction could be asserted out to 200 miles.3" The 1976
provisions of the Revised Single Negotiating Text3"' (RSNT) re-
mained substantially identical in this area, 30 2 but in 1977 the Infor-
mal Composite Negotiating Text30 3 (ICNT) shortened this
provision to state that there was jurisdiction with regard to "the
preservation of the marine environment; .... ."I' The ICNT ver-
sion was shortened to accommodate a general expansion of other
marine pollution provisions. The parallel article in the ICNT/
Rev. 1305 is identical to the provision in the ICNT; however, the
ICNT/Rev.2 provision was expanded to read "the protection and




Similar to the situation mentioned earlier regarding the
FCMA,3 °7the United States and other countries will probably find
that their diplomatic flexibility and options are being reduced.
Unilateral assertions such as the FCMA and the Pollution Act pres-
sure countries with the knowledge that failure to reach an accepta-
296. Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977, Public Act No. 28, pt. II,
[1977-11 New Zealand Statutes 92.
297. Id. § 27.
298. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Parts I, II, III, 4 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE THIRD
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 137 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
SNT]; U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.9/Part IV, 5 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE THIRD UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 111 (1976).
299. SNT, supra note 298, pt. II, art. 45, para. I(d).
300. Id. art. 46.
301. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Rev.I/Parts 1, II, III, 5 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE
THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 125 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as RSNT]; U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Rev. 1/Part IV, 6 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE
THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 144 (1977).
302. RSNT, supra note 301, at pt. II, art. 44, para. I(d).
303. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP. 10, 8 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE THIRD UNITED NA-
TIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ICNTJ.
304. Id. art 56, para. l(b)(iii).
305. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.I [hereinafter cited as ICNT/Rev.1].
306. ICNT/Rev.2, supra note 20, art. 56, para. l(b)(iii) (emphasis added).
307. See notes 214-21 supra and accompanying text.
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ble LOS treaty will precipitate a rash of unilateral claims over
marine pollution out to 200 miles-without the safeguards of the
ICNT/Rev.2. 0
Environmental issues relating to the emerging 200-mile eco-
nomic zone of the ICNT/Rev.2 involve jurisdictional questions,
such as who shall establish and enforce standards to control marine
pollution outside territorial waters; the international community,
the coastal State, or the flag State.
Most maritime countries at the early sessions of UNCLOS III
favored international standards to control marine pollution in the
200-mile economic zone, and they were supported by such Third
World countries as Argentina, Bahrain, Honduras, Kuwait,
Pakistan, Somalia, and Thailand.309 The authority of the coastal
State to supply supplementary regulations was supported by Aus-
tralia and Canada, but Belgium believed that it could be dangerous
to allow coastal States to add regulations.31 "Opposing the 'inter-
nationalists'31' were such countries as Bangladesh, France, and
Spain which felt that the coastal State had special rights to pollu-
tion control activities in its economic zone. 31 2 There were also
several countries advocating flag-State enforcement, and they in-
cluded France, Greece, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.3 3
Current ICNT/Rev.2 provisions state that pollution from ves-
sels is to be regulated by the Intergovernmental Maritime Consult-
ative Organization (IMCO). Under article 211, paragraph 2, flag-
State standards are a secondary mechanism and they must be at
least as effective as IMCO's standards. 3 4 These provisions appar-
ently will govern shipping, particularly on the high seas. If a vessel
is headed for a particular port, the port-State may promulgate pol-
lution standards for that vessel provided the standards conform to
IMCO's policies.3 5 Naturally, the territorial seas are governed by
coastal-State sovereignty,3 6but passage through the economic zone
308. See ICNT/Rev.2, supra note 20, arts. 207-37.
309. Alexander & Hodgson, supra note 36, at 595.
310. Id.
311. See Kindt, The Effect of Claims by Developing Countries On LOS International
Marine Pollution Negotiations, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 313 (1980).
312. Alexander & Hodgson, supra note 36, at 595.
313. Id.
314. ICNT/Rev.2, supra note 20, art. 211, para. 2.
315. Id. art. 211, para. 3.
316. Id. art. 211, para. 4.
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may be regulated only in accordance with IMCO's standards.31 7
Despite the ICNT/Rev.2 safeguards, "it is likely that there
may be serious interference at times with international navigation,
as vessels (particularly potential polluters such as oil tankers,
LNG318 carriers, and ammunition ships) pass through foreign eco-
nomic zones. ' 3 19 An early proposal by Barbados to the effect that
pollution control measures should not impede the industrialization
of the developing countries320 found acceptance throughout the
ICNT/Rev.2 provisions relating to marine pollution.321 Although
one goal of the marine pollution provisions was to maintain a max-
imum amount of navigational freedoms, it has been recognized that
the "possibility of double standards in the economic zones of some
developing nations is a very real one: one set of standards for ships
of the major maritime powers and another set for the coastal State
and for other developing countries." '322 Any such dual set of stan-
dards would violate the international legal principle of "reciproc-
ity," and although it would be cloaked by an eventual LOS treaty,
it would be tainted with unilateralism. Pollution standards estab-
lished via the authority of a future LOS treaty must not discrimi-
nate against one nation or group of nations. If standards do
discriminate, they become traditional unilateral extensions and are
invalid under customary international law.
V. CONCLUSION
The special claims impacting upon marine pollution issues
at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III) focus on extensions of maritime jurisdiction over
various areas of concern, with particular emphasis on claims to
greater fisheries jurisdiction or to protection of the marine environ-
ment. "While national sovereignty may permit adequate manage-
ment of fixed mineral resources, it cannot suffice to regulate marine
pollution or stocks of certain fish."'323 The South and Latin Ameri-
can countries initiated unilateral claims over fisheries, bootstrap-
317. Id. art. 211, para. 5. The typographical error in the ICNT/Rev. I in this section,
"international organizations," has been corrected in the ICNT/Rev.2 to read in the singular;
i:e., "international organization" (meaning IMCO).
318. LNG refers to "liquefied natural gas."
319. Alexander & Hodgson, supra note 36, at 595.
320. 1d.
321. See, e.g., ICNT/Rev.2, supra note 20, arts. 202-03.
322. Alexander & Hodgson, supra note 36, at 595.
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ping their maritime jurisdictions out to unreasonable limits, such as
200 miles. These 200-mile fisheries claims and similar unilateral
claims violated both customary international law and international
treaties, as well as the general gentlemen's agreement at UNCLOS
III not to assert unilateral claims pending the outcome of the nego-
tiations.324 However, most maritime and Third World powers exer-
cised restraint and limited unilateral extensions of maritime
jurisdiction.
With passage of the Fishery Conservation Management Act
(FCMA) declaring a 200-mile fisheries jurisdiction, the propagation
of unilateral claims by other nations began. Most of the unilateral
extensions of jurisdiction by other countries were more onerous in
their terms and impact than the 200-mile fisheries jurisdiction as-
serted by the United States. To the extent that other countries have
joined the United States in bilateral "Governing International
Fishery Agreements" (GIFAs) under a provision of the FCMA, the
FCMA is valid under international law. Even so, the trend of other
countries to extend unilaterally their jurisdictions was not notice-
ably obviated by GIFAs. The FCMA violated international law,
and its impact will be felt by the United States when a Law of the
Sea (LOS) treaty comes to the Senate for ratification. Increasingly,
the FCMA will reduce the diplomatic flexibility and options of the
United States. The FCMA will subject the United States to greater
pressure to accept unfavorable provisions (such as in the area of
deep seabed mining) in order to maintain the more moderate provi-
sions involving the navigational freedoms essential to United States
national security. Without a treaty guaranteeing navigational free-
doms and limiting unilateral extensions of jurisdiction, the poten-
tial for conflict is not only enhanced, but imminent.325
Unilateral claims to protect the marine environment from pol-
lution have paralleled the development of claims involving
fisheries, although claims over marine pollution have been fewer in
number due to the subordinate role of marine pollution issues at
UNCLOS III. Even so, if a major environmental disaster such as
the Pemex oil well blowout occurred in a geographic area already
sensitized to 200-mile claims, there would be a number of unilateral
extensions of jurisdiction over marine pollution. The hyper-sensi-
tivity demonstrated by the Mexican Government regarding its own
Pemex blowout would apply afortiori to a blowout by a United
324. See, e.g., id. at 105 n.5.
325. See id. at 110-11.
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States oil well. The United States needs to view the Pemex accident
in its proper perspective and not be pressured by domestic politics
into declaring a 200-mile jurisdiction over marine pollution. Like
the FCMA, such a declaration would violate international law and
constitute a disaster for United States oceans policy.
Even the unilateral Canadian declaration of a 100-mile Arctic
pollution zone in 1970 had unpredictable ramifications. The
Canadian action laid the groundwork for the jurisdiction to protect
the marine environment in the 200-mile zone as limited by the reg-
ular marine pollution provisions of the Informal Composite Nego-
tiating Text/Revision 2 (ICNT/Rev.2). The "limitations" on
marine pollution jurisdiction are an essential part of the ICNT/
Rev.2, and they place further pressure on the United States to ac-
cept a future LOS treaty, or the United States be faced with broad
claims against the traditional navigational freedoms.
If 200-mile claims extending jurisdiction over fisheries, marine
pollution, or other maritime matters were asserted by all coastal
countries, approximately 105 million square nautical miles (or 36
percent of the surface of the oceans) would be under unilateral ju-
risdictional control.326
Within these waters, fishermen take over ninety percent of the
world's fish catch and eighty-seven percent of the globe's known
submarine oil deposits is found. Also, certain bodies of water
which are now only semi-enclosed, such as the Persian Gulf, the
Gulf of Mexico, the Bay of Bengal, and the Norwegian and
Ockhotask Seas, are becoming zone-locked by such jurisdic-
tional claims. Even the North Pole, long the symbol of interna-
tional scientific cooperation, is being hemmed in by 200-mile
zones around the Canadian Arctic archipelago, Greenland, Sval-
bard, and Franz Josefland and other Soviet island groups.
327
It is thus imperative that unilateral extensions of maritime jurisdic-
tion be decried. Unilateral assertions are invalid under customary
international law and under existing treaties on the law of the sea.
Extensions of maritime jurisdiction can be valid only within the
context of multilateral agreements, supported by a majority of the
major maritime countries and a substantial number of the non-
maritime countries. Unilateral extensions of maritime jurisdiction,
for whatever reason, are invalid under international law. Unilat-
eral extensions of maritime jurisdiction are a blight upon the com-
munity of Man.
326. Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 42, at 321.
327. Id. at 321-22.
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SELECTED MAJOR AGREEMENTS RELATED
TO FISHERIES
A. Multilateral Treaties to which the United States has Acceded
as of 1979*
1. Fisheries
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958,
[1966] 1 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 599 U.N.T.S.
285 (entered into force Mar. 20, 1966).
Amended Agreement for the Establishment of the Indo-
Pacific Fisheries Council, approved Nov. 23, 1961,
[1962] 2 U.S.T. 2511, T.I.A.S. No. 5218, 418 U.N.T.S.
348 (entered into force Nov. 23, 1961).
Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American
Tropical Tuna Commission, signed May 31, 1949,
[1950] 1 U.S.T. 230, T.I.A.S. No. 2044, 80 U.N.T.S. 3
(entered into force Mar. 3, 1950).
International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of
the North Pacific Ocean, signed May 9, 1952, [1953] 1
U.S.T. 380, T.I.A.S. No. 2786, 205 U.N.T.S. 65 (en-
tered into force June 12, 1953).
U.N. Special Fund Project on Caribbean Fishery Devel-
opment, signed Apr. 6, 1966, [1968] 4 U.S.T. 4938,
T.I.A.S. No. 6501 (entered into force Apr. 6, 1966).
Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, done
May 14, 1966, [1969] 3 U.S.T. 2887, T.I.A.S. No.
6767, 673 U.N.T.S. 63 (entered into force Mar. 21,
1969).
2. South Pacjlc Commission
Agreement Establishing the South Pacific Commission,
signed Feb. 6, 1947, [19511 2 U.S.T. 1787, T.I.A.S.
No. 2317, 97 U.N.T.S. 227 (entered into force July 29,
1948).
Those cites without U.N.T.S. references are caused by the slowness of the U.N.
system in printing the U.N.T.S.
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3. Whaling
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, concluded
Sept. 24, 1931, 49 Stat. 3079, T.S. No. 880, 3 Bevans
26, 155 L.N.T.S. 349 (entered into force Jan. 16,
1935).
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
with Schedule of Whaling Regulations, signed Dec.
2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 4 Bevans
248, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 (entered into force Nov. 10,
1948).
Protocol to the International Convention for the Regula-
tion of Whaling Signed Under Date of Dec. 2, 1946,
done Nov. 19, 1956, [1959] 1 U.S.T. 952, T.I.A.S. No.
4228, 338 U.N.T.S. 336 (entered into force May 4,
1959).
B. Multilateral Treaties Not Involving the United States
1952 Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North
Pacific Ocean, 205 U.N.T.S. 65.
London Fisheries Convention, Mar. 9, 1964, 581 U.N.T.S.
57, reprinted in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG.SER.B/15, at
862 (1970).
Draft Convention on Wetlands of International Impor-
tance Especially as Waterfront Habitat, done Feb. 3,




A. Multilateral Treaties to which the United States has Acceded
as of 1979*
Convention on the Intergovernmental Consultative Or-
ganization, signed Mar. 6, 1948, [1958] 1 U.S.T. 621,
T.I.A.S. 4044, 289 U.N.T.S. 48 (entered into force
Mar. 17, 1958, subject to a reservation and under-
standing).
* Those cities without U.N.T.S. references are caused by the slowness of the U.N.
system in printing the U.N.T.S.
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Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by
Oil, May 12, 1954, [1961] 3 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No.
4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 8, 1961,
subject to an understanding, reservations, and a rec-
ommendation), as amended May 18 & June 28, 1967,
[1966] 2 U.S.T. 1523, T.I.A.S. No. 6109, 600 U.N.T.S.
322.
Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, [1962] 2
U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (en-
tered intoforce Sept. 30, 1962).
Convention on the Continental Shelf, done Apr. 29, 1958,
[1964] 1 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S.
311 (entered into force June 10, 1964).
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, done Apr. 29, 1958, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606,
T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 2205 (entered into
force Sept. 10, 1964).
Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime
Traffic, done Apr. 9, 1965, [1967] 1 U.S.T. 411,
T.I.A.S. No. 6251, 591 U.N.T.S. 265 (entered into
force May 16, 1967).
Convention for the International Council for the Explora-
tion of the Sea, done Sept. 12, 1964, [1973] 1 U.S.T.
1080, T.I.A.S. No. 7628, 652 U.N.T.S. 237 (entered
into force Apr. 18, 1973).
Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in
Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, done Nov. 29,
1969, [1975] 1 U.S.T. 765, T.I.A.S. No. 8068 (entered
into force May 6, 1975).
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, done Dec. 29,
1972, [1975] 2 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165 (entered
into force Aug. 30, 1975).
Convention on the International Regulations for Prevent-
ing of Collisions at Sea, done Oct. 20, 1972, [1976-77]
3 U.S.T. 3459, T.I.A.S. No. 8587 (entered into force
July 15, 1977).
B. Multilateral Treaties Not Involving the United States
1. Treaties
Convention on the Pollution of the North Sea by Oil,
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signed June 9, 1969, 704 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 9
INT'L LEGAL MATS. 20 (1970).
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage,
done Nov. 29, 1969, reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL
MATS. 45 (1970) (commonly referred to as Brussels
Liability Convention).
Convention on the Establishment of an International
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damge,
done Dec. 18, 1971, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL
MATS. 284 (1972) (commonly referred to as Fund
Convention).
Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, done Feb. 15,
1972, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 262 (1972)
(commonly referred to as Oslo Convention).
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution by Ships, done
Nov. 2, 1973, 12 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1319 (1973).
Convention on the Protection of the Environment, done
Feb. 19, 1974, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 591
(1974).
Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment
of the Baltic Sea Area, done Mar. 22, 1974, reprinted
in 13 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 544 (1974).
Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from
Land-Based Sources, openedfor signature June 4,
1974, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 352 (1974).
Draft Convention for the Protection of the Marine Envi-
ronment Against Pollution in the Mediterranean
Area, U.N. Doc. UNEP/WG.2/INF.3 (Jan. 13,
1975), reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 481 (1975).
2. Private Agreements**
Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liabil-
ity for Oil Pollution, signed Jan. 7, 1969, reprinted in
8 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 497 (1969) (commonly referred
to as TOVALOP).
Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Li-
ability for Oil Pollution, signed Jan. 14, 1971, re-
printed in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 137 (1971)
(commonly referred to as CRISTAL).
** United States oil companies are parties to these agreements.
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COUNTRIES WHO ARE SIGNATORIES TO
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS UNDER THE
FISHERY CONSERVATION AND
MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976: GOVERNING
INTERNATIONAL FISHERY AGREEMENTS
(GIFAs)*
1. GIFA, U.S.-Bulgaria, Dec. 17, 1976, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S.
No. 9045 (entered into force Feb. 28, 1977).
2. GIFA, U.S.-Cuba, Apr. 27, 1977, [1976-77] 6 U.S.T. 6769,
T.I.A.S. No. 8689 (entered into force Sept. 26, 1977).
3. GIFA, U.S.-German Democratic Republic, Oct. 5, 1976,
[1976-77] 2 U.S.T. 1793, T.I.A.S. No. 8527 (entered into force
Mar. 4, 1977).
4. GIFA, U.S.-Japan, March 18, 1977, [1976-77] 6 U.S.T. 7507,
T.I.A.S. No. 8728 (entered into force Nov. 29, 1977).
5. GIFA, U.S.-Korea, Jan. 4, 1977, [1976-77] 2 U.S.T. 1753,
T.I.A.S. No. 8526 (entered into force Mar. 3, 1977).
6. GIFA, U.S.-Mexico, Aug. 26, 1977, [1978-79] 1 U.S.T. 781,
T.I.A.S. No. 8852 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1977).
7. GIFA, U.S.-Poland, Aug. 2, 1976, [1976-77] 2 U.S.T. 1681,
T.I.A.S. No. 8524 (entered into force Feb. 28, 1977).
8. GIFA, U.S.-Romania, Nov. 23, 1976, [1978-79] 1 U.S.T. 387,
T.I.A.S. No. 8825 (entered into force Jan. 18, 1978).
9. GIFA, U.S.-Spain, Feb. 16, 1977, [1976-77] 2 U.S.T. 1631,
T.I.A.S. No. 8523 (entered into force Mar. 10, 1977).
10. GIFA, U.S.-Taiwan, Sept. 15, 1976, [1976-77] 2 U.S.T. 7903,
T.I.A.S. No. 8529 (entered into force Feb. 28, 1977).
11. Reciprocal fisheries agreement, U.S.-U.K., June 24, 1977, -
U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 9140 (entered into force Nov. 7, 1978).
12. GIFA, U.S.-USSR, Nov. 26, 1976, [1976-77] 2 U.S.T. 1847,
T.I.A.S. No. 8528 (entered into force Feb. 28, 1977).
GIFA is the general abbreviation for a bilateral treaty negotiated under the FCMA
and properly entitled an "Agreement Concerning Fisheries off the Coasts of the United
States." The GIFAs initials derived from the popular general term for such an agreement;
namely, a "Governing International Fishery Agreement." As of the date this chart was
prepared, several U.S.T. cites were not yet available.
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